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KOLMOGOROV'S APORIA AND SOLUTION 
BY  
CONSTRUCTION OF A RELATIVIZED AND QUANTIFIED 
CONCEPT OF FACTUAL PROBABILITY 





Abstract. The crucial but very confidential fact is brought into evidence that – as Kolmogorov himself repeatedly claimed – the 
mathematical theory of probabilities cannot be applied to physical, factual probabilistic situations because the factual concept of 
probability distribution is not defined : it is nowhere specified how to construct factually for a given physical random phenomenon, the 
specific numerical distribution of probabilities to be asserted on the universe of outcomes generated by that phenomenon; nor is 
it known what significance to associate to the assertion of mere 'existence' of such a factual distribution of numerically defined 
probabilities. An algorithm of semantic integration of this factual numerically defined distribution of probabilities is then constructed. 
This algorithm, developed inside a general method of relativized conceptualization, involves a sort of "quantification" of the factual 
concept of probability. The mentioned result, while it solves Kolmogorov's aporia, fully organizes the general classical concept of 
probability, from both a factual and a syntactic standpoint. In particular, it appears that, while "randomness" can be considered to 
be a natural fact, the concepts of 'random phenomenon' and 'probabilistic situation' are factual-conceptual artifacts. As for 




The concept of probability is ancient and intuitive. It belongs to common thinking and speaking. 
The mathematical formalization of this concept has begun relatively late in the history of thought 
(Blaise Pascal 1654) and it evolved slowly (Bernoulli 1713, Richard von Mises 1931). The first 
thorough axiomatic and mathematical formalization has been given in 1933 by Andreï N. Kolmogorov 
[1950]. 
Meanwhile, in physics, Ludwig Boltzmann, long before Kolmogorov's work, has introduced his 
famous concept of statistical entropy (1872-1877) which rooted the second principle of 
thermodynamics into atomic physics via the relative frequencies of outcome assigned to the 
considered 'events' 1. 
Much later Shannon [1948] published his theory of communication (refined by Khinchin [1957]) 
where Kolmogorov's abstract concept of a probability measure is made use of as a given primary 
concept. Instead of 'events', Shannon introduced an 'alphabet' of signs {ai}, i=1,2,....n on which he 
posited individual probabilities p(ai), i=1,2,....n constituting a probability 'measure' in the sense of 
Kolmogorov's abstract theory of probabilities. Furthermore Shannon defined as a central concept of 
his theory, an entropic form called informational entropy of the source of the signs {ai}, i=1,2,....n, 
where in the place of Boltzmann's statistical relative frequencies of outcomes of physical events he 
introduced the abstract probabilities p(ai), i=1,2,....n of the signs from the alphabet {ai}, i=1,2,....n. 
For some time Shannon's concept of informational entropy seemed to permit the construction of 
entropic measures of complexity thus leading to a mathematical theory of complexity. But, 
surprisingly, 30 years after his construction of what was unanimously considered as an achieved 
modern mathematical theory of physical probabilistic situations, Kolmogorov became aware that his 
mathematical representation of the concept of probability was in fact devoid of a factual basis because 
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the factual concept of physical probability simply is not defined. Therefore Kolmogorov began to 
claim that his mathematical theory of probabilities is not, as he had believed, an abstract reformulation 
of a well constructed physical concept, but exclusively an interesting mathematical construct. He also 
asserted that consequently his theory of probabilities cannot be made use of as a basis for Shannon's 
theory of communication; nor, a fortiori, for a concept of informational entropy that be utilizable for 
estimating complexities of factual entities. So he initiated another approach for measuring 
complexities, namely the well known theory of 'algorithmic complexity' of sequences of signs, which 
Chaitin and other authors keep developing.  
In the algorithmic representation of the complexity of a sequence of signs, the semantic contents 
of the considered sequence of signs get entirely lost. While on the other hand, in the recent approaches 
on systems and on organization, the accent falls more and more heavily upon the structures of 
significances; so far however the mentioned approaches stubbornly stay purely qualitative. 
So, quite confidentially, the crucial correlated concepts of factual probability, information and 
complex systems, are undergoing a crisis. 
It is not current, nor easy, to convey both a fundamental problem and a solution of it in only a 
couple of pages. However precisely this is what is tried in this work.  
We shall first define thoroughly the problem of factual probabilities. Then we shall construct an 
effective solution to this problem. This will be done inside a general method of relativized 
conceptualization of which the first principles have been drawn from the descriptions of microstates as 
these are involved in the mathematical formalism of fundamental quantum mechanics (MMS [1991], 
[1992A], [1992B], [1993], [2008], [2009] (MMS: M. Mugur-Schächter)). 
The reader is asked to excuse a largely personal bibliography: this is not a work of erudition, it 
is a construction extracted from a work developed in extreme isolation. 
 3 
II. KOLMOGOROV'S CONFIDENTIAL APORIA: 
ABSENCE OF DEFINITION FOR A FACTUAL PROBABILITY LAW 
II.1. Kolmogorov’s Classical Definition of a Probability Space 
The fundamental concept of the nowadays mathematical theory of probabilities – in 
Kolmogorov's formulation – is a probability space [U, τ , p(τ)] where: U={ei} (with i∈I and I an index 
set) is a universe of elementary events ei (a set) generated by the repetition of an 'identically' 
reproducible procedure Π (called also 'experiment') which, notwithstanding the posited identity 
between all its realizations, nevertheless brings forth elementary events ei that vary in general from 
one realization of Π to another one; τ  is an algebra of events built on U 2, an event – let us denote it e 
– being a subset of U and being posited to have occurred each time that any elementary event ei from e 
has occurred; p(τ) is a probability measure defined on the algebra of events τ 3.  
A pair (Π,U) containing an identically reproducible procedure Π and the corresponding universe 
of elementary events U is called a random phenomenon. 
On a given universe U one can define various algebras τ of events. So it is possible to form 
different associations [[random phenomenon], [a corresponding probability space]], all stemming from 
the same pair (Π,U). 
With respect to the previous representations of the concept of probability (Bernoulli, von Mises, 
etc.) – where only the 'probability law' was defined mathematically – Kolmogorov's concept of a 
probability space [U,τ, p(τ)] has marked a huge progress: via this concept the formal representation of 
the factual situations qualified as 'probabilistic' became inserted in a definite way into the very 
elaborate mathematical syntax of the theory of measures, whereas previously these situations had been 
only intuitively characterized, though also numbers were made use of. 
II.2. On the physical interpretation of an abstract probability measure 
The probability measure p(τ) is the unique specifically 'probabilistic' element from a 
Kolmogorov probability space. Now, to this very day, the application of this formal concept, to a 
factual situation which is unanimously considered to be 'probabilistic', has not yet been founded upon 
an explicit and general effective procedure for specifying the involved factual and numerically defined 
distribution of probabilities. It is not even clearly known what significance one has to assign to the 
assertion that in this or that concrete situation asserted to be probabilistic, there 'exists' a numerically  
defined distribution of probabilities; a fortiori it is not known how to identify this distribution. The 
specification – even only in principle – of such a procedure-and-significance would suffice for 
installing a concept of factual probability 'law' that be acceptable as a physical interpretation of the 
mathematical concept of a probability measure. This would rehabilitate Kolmogorov's mathematical 
representation in the status that deserves the denomination of a mathematical theory of physical 
probabilities. However the specification of such a procedure-and-significance is entirely lacking. This 
is surprising concerning a concept so currently utilized and which so often plays a basically important 
role. In this or that particular case when statistical dispersions are recorded while some set of stable 
global conditions permits to define what is called a random phenomenon, one just asserts – on the 
basis of symmetries  – that an a priori uniformly distributed probability law on the involved universe 
of elementary events is justified; and in consequence of this, the probability of each event from the 
algebra defined on the universe of elementary events, is defined as the ratio between the number of 
elementary events by which the considered event can arise and the number of all the possible 
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 An algebra built on a set S is a set of subsets of S – S itself and the void set Ø being always included – which is such that if it contains the 
subsets A and B, then it also contains A∪B and A – B.    
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 A probability measure defined on U consists of a set of real numbers p(A), each one associated to an event A from U and such that: 
0≤p(A)≤1, p(U)=1 (norm), p(Ø)=0, and p(A∪B)≤p(A)+p(B) where the equality obtains only if A and B are mutually 'independent' in the 
sense of probabilities i.e. if they have no elementary event ei in common (A∩B=Ø). The number p(A) is defined as the value of the 
mathematical limit – supposed to exist – toward which any relative frequency n(A)/N converges when the number N of realizations of the 
involved repeatable procedure Π  is increased toward infinity, n(A) being the number of outcomes of A when Π  is repeated N times.    
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elementary events from the universe of elementary events. This definition, however, cannot be made 
use of in any case. For in general no obvious symmetries do come in and the a priori uniform law of 
the elementary events is not confirmed by the a posteriori effectively counted relative frequencies of 
the outcomes of the various elementary events from the considered universe. 
The problem specified above still keeps quite confidential, and also vague. For the majority of 
physicists, for the specialists of communication, for the mathematicians who only make use of the 
theory of probabilities without placing it in the heart of their research, for the men in the street, a 
profane confidence reigns that all the important questions concerning probabilities certainly have since 
a long time obtained an answer in the specialized works. Beliefs of this sort arise concerning any 
scientific question. They are the fragile but necessary ground on which the evolution of science quietly 
rolls. But those who develop a research involving the foundations of the theory of probabilities are 
entirely conscious that today the mathematical concept of a probability measure entails a vitally 
important problem of interpretation. Kolmogorov ( [1963]) himself wrote (quoted in Segal [2003]) :  
« I have already expressed the view …that the basis for the applicability of the results of the mathematical 
theory of probability to real random phenomena must depend in some form on the frequency concept of 
probability, the unavoidable nature of which has been established by von Mises in a spirited 
manner…..(But) The frequency concept (of probability)4 which has been based on the notion of limiting 
frequency as the number of trials increases to infinity, does not contribute anything to substantiate the 
applicability of the results of probability theory to real practical problems where we have always to deal 
with a finite number of trials ». 
This quotation deserves much attention. One cannot be clearer. Nevertheless let us comment. At 
the present time there exists a more or less fuzzy but very acting belief according to which the theorem 
of large numbers would establish in a deductive way the existence, for any factual random 
phenomenon, of a factual probability 'law' of which, moreover, also the numerical distribution would 
be specified by this theorem. But this is false. The well known theorem of large numbers asserts only 
what follows (I make use of the traditional notations).   
Given a set {ej}, j=1,2,….q of events ej  (or of elementary events, indifferently), if a probability 
law {p(ej)}, j≡1,2, ….q on this set does exist, then for every ej and every pair (ε,δ) of two arbitrarily 
small real numbers, there exists an integer N0 such that when the number N of 'identical' reproductions 
of the experiment Π from the considered random phenomenon becomes equal to, or bigger than N0, 
the meta-probability 
P [(n(ej)/N - p(ej)) ≤ ε ]                                                                               (1) 
of the meta-event that [the absolute value of the difference (n(ej)/N – p(ej)) between, on the one hand 
the relative frequency n(ej)/N counted for the event ej, and on the other hand what is called the 
probability p(ej) of the event ej, be smaller than or equal to ε ], becomes bigger or equal to (1-δ). This 
can also be expressed in a more synthetic manner by the following well known entirely symbolic 
writing: 
∀j,  ∀(ε, δ),      (∃N0 :   ∀(N≥ N0))  ⇒   P[(n(ej)/N – p(ej) ) ≤ ε ] ≥ (1 - δ)      (2) 
This same assertion is sometimes expressed less precisely by saying that if a probability law 
{p(ej)}, j=1,2,….q does exist on the set of events {ej}, j=1,2, …q,  then for any j, as N 'tends toward 
infinity', the absolute value of the difference between the relative frequency n(ej)/N and the probability 
p(ej), 'tends in probability' toward 0, i.e. it tends nearly certainly toward 0. Nearly certainly, not 
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certainly, because in the expression P[(n(ej)/N - p(ej)) ≤ ε ] the symbol P designates itself only a 
meta-probability, not a certainty5.  
So in the theorem of large numbers the existence of a factual probability law is by no means 
proved. It is just posited that a 'probability law' does exist, without distinguishing explicitly between 
an abstract law that defines exclusively the general purely syntactic structure of any probability law, 
abstract or factual, and a factual probability law that would specify also the numerical distribution of 
the individual probabilities posited to make up this law.  
What is proved indeed by the theorem of large numbers is that if a probability law {p(ej) }, 
j=1,2….q does exist – any one and non specified numerically – then, as the number N of the achieved 
trials increases 'toward infinity' (a non-effective assumption), the mathematical tendency of each 
relative frequency n(ej)/N of an event ej toward the numerically non specified individual probability 
p(ej) assigned to ej by this supposedly existing law, is itself very 'probable' in the sense of another 
probability law denoted by the symbol P, which is also just posited to 'exist'.  
So concerning the significance to be assigned to the assertion of 'existence' of a factual 
probability law, the law of large numbers offers only an infinite regression.  
As for the numerical distribution of the posited probability law {p(ej) }, j=1,2….q, a definition of 
it is constructed inside the very theorem of large numbers – the famous 'relative frequency definition', 
insured by the use of the meta-probability P just posited in its turn to exist – but this definition : (a) is 
non effective (as noted above and as stressed by Kolmogorov); and (b) it is constructed on the basis of 
the bare postulation of the existence of the two probability laws {p(ej) }, j=1,2….q and P, without in 
any way specifying in what sort of physical features of what sort of physical entity this existence 
consists. Indeed, in (2) the counted relative frequencies n(ej)/N can be conceived to play a role of 
specification-by-materialization of merely ideally observable limiting numerical values p(ej) that are 
not independently defined, only if they are a priori conceived to be somehow subjected to the 
postulated existence of these limits themselves: otherwise why should a convergence manifest itself?  
This is the very intricately circular conceptual situation toward which point Kolmogorov's above 
quoted critics.  
When one concentrates attention upon this circular situation it leaps to one's eyes that as long as 
an independently constructed concept of a factual and effective, numerically specified probability 
distribution, is lacking, it is improper to relate physical probabilities, with a formal system like 
Kolmogorov's mathematical theory of probabilities. So what is lacking is an independent and 
effective, factually constructed definition of the existence and of the numerical distribution of 
individual probabilities tied with the particular features of any given physical 'probabilistic situation'. 
Kolmogorov's mathematical concept of a probability measure can only be the general formal 
representation induced by the class of all the conceivable such effective factual definitions. It cannot 
be their generator. Kolmogorov's mathematical characterization of a probability measure leaves this 
measure devoid of any specification able to connect it with a given, singular, concrete probabilistic 
situation. 
Confusions between the conditions to be required – specifically – concerning the description of 
a given factual entity, and on the other hand the conditions to be required concerning a purely 
syntactic framework for the representation of a whole class of descriptions of a same general type, are 
not rare. And quite systematically such confusions introduce long-lasting illusory problems. There 
exists a sort of idolatry of mathematical syntax that induces the implicit belief that it should be 
possible to derive factual data inside a syntactic system. But this is never possible.     
Already before Kolmogorov, other authors also have manifested reservations with respect the 
applicability of Kolmogorov's theory of probabilities. For instance R. J. Solomonoff [1957] wrote6:  
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« Probability theory tells how to derive a new probability distribution from old probability 
distributions…….. It does not tell how to get a probability distribution from data in the real world ».  
But it was Kolmogorov himself who finally developed a definitive veto concerning the 
applicability of his mathematical theory, to factual problems. Throughout the decade 1980 he 
expressed refusal of Shannon's central concept of 'informational entropy'7. Quite radically, 
Kolmogorov [1983] has advocated the elimination of his own formal concept of probability, from all 
the representations which had been considered as 'applications' of this concept. In particular, he wrote: 
«1. Information theory must precede probability theory and not be based on it. By the very essence of this 
discipline, the foundations of information theory have a finite combinatorial character.  
   2. The applications of probability theory can be put on a uniform basis. It is always a matter of 
consequences of hypotheses about the impossibility of reducing in one way or another the complexity of 
the descriptions of the objects in question. Naturally this approach to the matter does not prevent the 
development of probability theory as a branch of mathematics being a special case of general measure 
theory.  
3. The concepts of information theory as applied to infinite sequences give rise to very interesting 
investigations, which, without being indispensable as a basis of probability theory, can acquire a certain 
value in the investigation of the algorithmic side of mathematics as a whole». 
II.3. Refusal of Kolmogorov's reaction 
In short, the father of the modern mathematical theory of probabilities wanted the informational 
problems as well as those concerning complexity, to be treated from now on without making use of the 
formal concept of probability. He wanted them to be treated by the means of, exclusively, 
combinatorial analyses of « hypotheses about the impossibility of somehow reducing in one way or 
another the complexity of the descriptions of the objects in question ». As for probabilities, he wanted 
to confine them inside the purely mathematical general measure-theory as long as no clear definition 
of a physical interpretation would become available. He conceived to imprison in an abstract cage the 
concept of probability so profoundly rooted into the concrete human experience!!!  
This is a proposition made by a major thinker, so it has to be seriously taken into account. But it 
is an extreme proposition. Among mathematicians this proposition has been accepted without 
resistance and it has already changed the direction of research concerning 'complexity'. This is not 
surprising. For many mathematicians the physical entities are like shadows of the mathematical ones.  
But for a physicist it is simply not conceivable that a formal concept like that of a probability 
measure – which stems from factuality – be unable to point in return toward an explicitly constructible 
factual significance. For a physicist the conceptual situation explicated above is simply scandalous. 
So the problem dealt with in this work is: construct a general and effective factual definition of 
the numerical distribution of individual probabilities to be associated to any given 'probabilistic 
situation'. Thereby the assertion of existence of such a specifically appropriate numerical distribution 
of an effectively and factually defined probability law, would also acquire some definite content.     
The problem formulated above will be treated here inside a general method of relativized 
conceptualization – MCR – which I keep developing since 1984 (MS [1984], [1991], [1992B], 
[1992C], [1993], [1995], [1997A], [2002A], [2002B], [2006], [2008], [2009]. This method has been 
constructed by a synthesis and an adequate generalization of results progressively obtained concerning 
the way in which the mathematical formalism of the fundamental quantum mechanics succeeds to 
signify. 
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the abstract theory of probability measures, should suffice. 
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 The mathematical expression H(S)=Σipilog(1/pi) which possesses the same form as Boltzmann's function of physical statistical entropy 
S=Σi(n(ej)/N)log(1/(n(ej)/N)) but where, instead of the relative frequencies (n(ej)/N  of a set of factual events {ej}, j=1,2, …,…q, are inserted 
the probabilities from a probability measure {pi}, i=1,2,…q in the sense of Kolmogorov's theory, defined on a set of signs {ai}, i=1,2,…q 
emitted by a 'source of information' in order to be coded and made use of for the transmission of messages. 
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III. THE FRAMEWORK FOR TREATING KOLMOGOROV'S APORIA: 
FROM "INFRA-QUANTUM MECHANICS" TO A 
"METHOD OF RELATIVIZED CONCEPTUALIZATION"  
In this chapter – for the sake of self-consistency and in order to make understandable the use of 
the general method of relativized conceptualization – I give a telegraphic sketch of the genesis and the 
main features of the method of relativized conceptualization.   
III.1. A hypothesis tied with a historical fact 
There has been no equivalent, for quantum mechanics, of a Newton, a Maxwell, a Carnot, a 
Boltzmann, an Einstein. Quantum mechanics arose from a relatively big number of very different 
contributions (from Plank, Einstein, Bohr, de Broglie, Schrödinger, Heisenberg, Born, Pauli, von 
Neumann, Dirac, etc.) which finally led to a coherent mathematical theory of microstates – 
fundamental quantum mechanics – that yields predictions founded on a system of algorithms. 
However, up to this very day, the quantum mechanical algorithms possess a cryptic character and raise 
problems of interpretation. Nobody claims to fully understand how quantum mechanics manages to 
signify.  
What determined these peculiar specificities?  
This question, if one becomes aware of it, suggests the following hypothesis. The aim, for a 
human being, to construct knowledge concerning microstates, involved a cognitive situation so 
radically different from all those encountered before, and so extreme, that no individual mind has been 
able to dwell with it globally, in isolation. But each time that this or that physicist tried to confront the 
aim of constructing knowledge about microstates, this same very peculiar cognitive situation acted, 
without getting wholly explicit in that physicist's mind. So the construction of the quantum mechanical 
formalism has been orchestrated by an impersonal, very peculiar cognitive situation.  
As for the way of signifying of the quantum mechanical formalism, it remained cryptic because 
each time that an interpretation problem was examined, over and over again the problem was much 
more referred to the formalism itself than to the cognitive situation which determined its structure. 
Correlatively, this cognitive situation and its consequences have never been characterized explicitly, 
thoroughly and globally. 
III.2. A project 
The above formulated hypothesis suggested a project: to make tabula rasa of the mathematical 
formalism of quantum mechanics and to try to construct, in strictly qualitative terms, some 
communicable and consensual knowledge concerning 'microstates', by obeying exclusively the 
constraints imposed by the involved cognitive situation and by the general human ways of 
conceptualizing. This project led to what I called infra-quantum mechanics, a sort of epistemological-
physical representation of microstates, constructed independently of quantum mechanics but where the 
whole way of signifying of fundamental quantum mechanics becomes clear (MS [2008], [2009]).     
III.3. Sketch of the construction of infra-quantum mechanics 
What follows is summarized to the extreme. The summary is focused on the goal to bring into 
evidence the 'absolutely' basic source of a certain radically relativized descriptional form, and to 
enable the reader to grasp via its genesis the specific powers of this form, its consequences on the 
concept of probability, the universality hidden in it, and the potentialities involved by this universality. 
Any knowledge that can be communicated without restrictions (like those involved in pointing 
toward, miming, etc.), is description. A description involves by definition an object-entity-to-be-
described (which in general is not also an "object" in the usual sense) and qualifications of this object-
entity.  
 8 
The basic object-entities-of-description of quantum mechanics are what is a priori denominated 
'states of microsystems' or in short microstates8. These are hypothetical entities from a class of which 
the existence is postulated beforehand on historical and methodological grounds, but which no human 
being could ever perceive. The construction for entities of this sort, of qualifications endowed with 
some kind of stability, raises difficult and deep questions. Nevertheless quantum mechanics exhibits 
very performing qualifications of microstates which, necessarily, are reducible to some form of 
description. This manifests that a descriptional strategy has been at work which has succeeded to 
overcome the epistemological difficulties. As announced, we want to explicate this descriptional 
strategy under the constraints imposed by, exclusively, the involved cognitive situation and the general 
human modes of conceptualizing. 
III.3.1. Microstates as objects of description 
Consider first the entities that are the objects-of-description, the microstates. Since they cannot 
be perceived, it is not possible to make them available for study by just selecting them from some 
ensemble of pre-existing entities. Nor can one study entities of this kind by just examining observable 
marks spontaneously produced on macroscopic devices by admittedly 'naturally' pre-existing 
microstates: no criteria would then exist for deciding which mark is to be assigned to which 
microstate. The unique possible general solution has been identified to be the following one. First, to 
accomplish a defined and repeatable macroscopic operation that is just posited to generate a given 
though unknown microstate; and afterward, to try to somehow manage to 'know' something about this 
supposedly generated microstate. 
So consider the hypothetical microstate produced by a given operation of generation. The goal is 
to acquire concerning this microstate, information cast in certain pre-established terms, namely in 
'mechanical' terms involving what is called 'position', or 'momentum', or 'energy', etc. The grids for the 
desired sorts of qualification are conceived beforehand and quite independently of the generated 
object-microstate. And – with respect to these grids – the object-microstate emerges in general still 
entirely unknown, still strictly non-qualified. This assertion is not in the least weakened by the 
presuppositions of existence of 'microstates', in general, and of the emergence of a given sort of 
microstate when a given macroscopic operation of generation is realized. Even though these 
presuppositions insert already the generated microstate into a net of pre-conceptualization, so into a 
kind of pre-posited conceptual mould for the researched new knowledge, the particular microstate that 
has been generated emerges non-perceptible, so a fortiori still entirely non singularized from the 
specific points of view expressed by the definitions of the desired qualifications of this microstate.  
But on the other hand the generated microstate emerges also relative – in a non removable way 
– to the employed operation of generation, and this permits now to label it: it is a result of this, known, 
macroscopically defined operation of state-generation. Let us immediately embody this possibility. 
We symbolize by G the considered operation of generation and we subject it to the condition of being 
reproducible in a communicable way. We denote by msG the corresponding generated microstate. 
Though in this incipient stage the symbols G and msG are devoid of any mathematical representation, 
their introduction is of utmost importance. Indeed it installs inside the realm of the communicable, the 
fact that the generated microstate, though entirely unknown from the point of view of the specific 
qualifications that are researched for it, is nevertheless captured, it is made stably available for being 
'studied'. From now, by reproducing G, it is possible to produce as many 'copies' of the microstate 
denoted msG as one wants, and each copy can be subjected to some subsequent operation of 
'examination', while communicating clearly what one does, by words and signs. This, however 
involves a  posit. Namely that any realization of the operation G produces a replica of one and same 
microstate: that one, denoted msG, that is labeled by that operation G. In other words: 
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A microstate can be stabilized in the role of an object-entity for qualifications via subsequent 
processes of examination, if and only if one posits a one-to-one relation Gս msG.  
The question of the acceptability of such a one-to-one relation Gս msG has been very 
thoroughly examined elsewhere9. Here we just mention that this posit simply is unavoidable in the 
considered cognitive situation. If it is not introduced one cannot start the desired construction of some 
knowledge concerning microstates. On the other hand, the consequences of the acceptance of this posit 
are illuminating. So we do admit it, by a methodological decision according to which: 
That which is obtained by any realization of the macroscopically defined operation of generation 
denoted G – whatever it be – is called 'the' microstate corresponding to G (the grammatical 
singular) and it is denoted msG.  
Thereby we are now in possession of an a-conceptual specification – 'definition' – of an 
unlimited number of replicas of the object-entity 'the microstate msG corresponding to G'; namely, a 
purely operational-factual specification of an object-entity still strictly nonqualified as to its 
singularities inside the class a priori labeled by the word 'microstate'. Indeed G is not a qualification of 
msG. It is only the specification of the way of producing it (if one knows how, say, a baby has been 
produced, this does not entail knowledge about the result of the various possible operations of 
qualification of that baby itself). But, though non-qualifying, this sort of 'definition' can be made 
communicable and consensual. This is very remarkable because it circumvents the lack of any 
predicate for defining a given particular microstate in the usual, classical way. Indeed in classical 
conceptualization a definition is usually realized verbally-conceptually, by the help of predicates that 
both define and qualify at the same time (open a dictionary and seek, say, 'cat'. One finds (Webster, 
fourth edition of the Merriam series): «carnivorous domesticated quadruped….»).  
So the initial extremity of the chain of information that was to be started is now established, on 
the basis of a methodological decision that separates radically, in a non-classical way, the 
introduction of an entity in the role of object-of-qualification, from the operations of qualification of 
this entity. 
III.3.2. Qualifying a microstate: emergence of a 'primordially' statistical qualification 
We can now enter upon the second stage of this investigation, the stage of construction of a 
certain knowledge concerning specifically the generated object-entity denoted msG.  
Such as it emerges from the operation G, the microstate denoted msG is not observable by man. 
So it has now to be brought to trigger some observable manifestations on the level of human 
observability. This can be realized only by use of some macroscopic apparatus able to interact with the 
generated microstate msG.  
The interaction, however, in general changes the initial microstate msG.  
Furthermore, the observable manifestations produced by an interaction between a replica of msG 
and a macroscopic apparatus, consist of just some visible or audible marks exhibited by the registering 
devices of the apparatus, not by msG itself. They are manifestations transferred upon the registering 
devices of the apparatus. Moreover the transferred observable marks produced by an interaction 
between a replica of the microstate msG and a macroscopic apparatus, do never trigger in the observer's 
mind some qualia permitting to directly 'feel' the nature of the qualifying aspect of which the 
apparatus has been designed to register a qualitative or numerical 'value' (as it happens when 'red' is 
perceived, which is directly felt to be what is called a 'colour'). Therefore the significance of the 
registered transferred manifestations in terms of a given value of a given qualifying quantity, has to be 
entirely constructed in some conceptual-operational-material way. This is far from being a trivial task. 
Inside the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics – which has deliberately researched 
as a mechanics applicable to microstates – each conceptual re-definition of a mechanical qualifying 
quantity XM has been achieved via a formal prolongation of the mathematical definition associated to 
that quantity inside the classical macroscopic mechanics (which necessarily involves some connection 
                                                 
9
 Specifically for microstates in MS [2008] and [2009] and in general terms in MS [2002A], [2002B], [2006]. 
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with the classical concept of a "mobile"). But inside infra-quantum mechanics, mathematical 
representations are deliberately banished in order to bring into evidence the consequences entailed by, 
exclusively, the cognitive conditions and the general human ways of conceptualizing which are 
involved when a human being tries to construct knowledge concerning 'microstates'. Nevertheless, 
though in strictly qualitative terms, we want to construct a representation of knowledge concerning 
microstates that would be specifically comparable with the mathematical representations from 
quantum mechanics. So infra-quantum mechanics must somehow encompass the possibility to refer to 
mechanical quantities initially defined inside classical thinking and then redefined for microstates. In 
these conditions how can we proceed? 
Consider a 'test'-operation X that is realizable on a microstate by the use of a macroscopic 
apparatus A(X) and each realization of which ends by a 'transfer' upon the registering devices of A(X), 
of a set {µX} of marks10 that can be directly perceived by the human biological sensorial systems. The 
set of all the transferred marks observed to emerge in this way will be called the spectrum of data 
corresponding to the test-operation X.  
   Let us now admit on conceptual and historical bases that what is called a 'microstate' msG is 
such that for any mechanical quantity X that has been defined inside the classical mechanics, there 
exists at least one test-operation X(X) which in some sense 'corresponds' to X so that it can be regarded 
as the transposition to microstates of the classical definition of the mechanical quantity X: just a posit 
of mere existence associated with the symbol X(X), but void of any other specification. Nevertheless, 
on the basis of this posit the symbol X(X) points now toward a previously defined mechanical quantity 
X and it can be considered to represent a 'measurement'-interaction of which the result indicates a 
numerical value Xj of X. So we write X(X)≡M(X). But this, in order to be useful, must be associated 
with coding rule which transposes any set of observable marks {µX} produced by one realization on 
msG of the test X(X) into one definite numerical value Xj from a set {Xj}, j∈J of possible numerical 
values of Xj assigned to the quantity X tied with the test-operation X(X) (J: an index set, here discrete 
and finite by construction, for effectiveness). If, and only if, an appropriate conceptual-operational-
methodological construct is actually achieved which realizes such a coding, then the involved set of all 
the possible numerical values Xj will be called the spectrum of the quantity X attached to the test-
operation X(X) and A(X) will be regarded as an apparatus for measuring this quantity.  
Suppose that all that has been required above is insured. Then the initiated process of 
construction of a strictly qualitative consensual knowledge on microstates that deserve being called an 
infra-quantum mechanics can be continued, notwithstanding the fact that it consists exclusively of the 
descriptional consequences entailed by the constraints stemming from the cognitive situation and the 
human ways of conceptualizing. 
Immediately however the central condition of unambiguous numerical coding of the observable 
data produced by the test-operation X(X) raises a new obstacle: the assumption of transpositions 
applicable to microstates, of classical mechanical qualifications like 'position', 'momentum', 'kinetic 
energy', necessarily involve some model of a microstate, even if a very vague one. For without any 
such model – nor any qualia concerning the studied microstate indicated by the sets {µX} of 
observable data – there would be no connection whatever between the 'mechanical' description of a 
microstate and the classical mechanical descriptions achieved via qualifying quantities that have been 
extracted by abstraction from the directly observable motion of macroscopic bodies. So it would not 
be possible to justify why some given sort of measurement-interaction M(X)≡X(X) corresponds to 
precisely this or that classical mechanical quantity X. (And indeed, a careful examination shows that – 
contrary to the current orthodox assertion that quantum mechanics is free from any modelization – de 
Broglie's initial 'corpuscular wave' model remained implicitly incorporated in the quantum mechanical 
mathematical algorithms which represent a measurement process) (MMS [2009A] pp. 113-118 and 
MMS [2009B]). This organic connection between the definability of a measurement interaction M(X) 
and a model of microstates appears at a first sight as an insuperable obstacle inside an approach which, 
by the exclusivity of the accepted constraints, interdicts not only mathematical representations, but 
also any specified model attached to the general concept of microstate. But in fact this difficulty also 
                                                 
10
 For the sake of effectiveness it is supposed that the number of possible distinct sets {µX} is finite (anyhow, any numerical estimation 
performed on these marks, even if only concerning their space-time location, introduces units, so discreteness).  
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has been circumvented. It has been transcended via a (quite non trivial) general frame-condition which 
permits to code the observed marks by the use, exclusively, of their space-time locations, thus 
tolerating at its core a perfect void of specification of the semantic contents of the observable marks 
produced by the measurement-interactions M(X) tied with a test-operation X(X) (MMS [20009] 
pp.118-12211): like in the case of the measurement interactions themselves, such semantic 
specifications for these results of these are only posited to exist and to be mutually individualized by 
the rule of coding accordingly to the general frame-condition. 
This having been spelled out, let us ask now the following question. Can the values Xj which 
code for the groups {µX} of transferred observable marks produced by measurement-interactions M(X) 
of the kind just characterized above, be conceived to qualify the involved microstate itself ? The 
answer is obviously negative. Indeed the measurement-interaction M(X) must be conceived to change 
in general the microstate msG that has been initially created by the operation of generation G. So the 
observable transferred marks emerge indelibly relative to also this change, so relative to also the 
employed sort of measurement-interaction. It follows that the transferred marks characterize only 
globally the whole measurement-interaction, not separately the supposed object-microstate msG.  
One can however cling to the fact that the observable marks are relative to also the initially 
created microstate msG. One has then to take into account that two clearly distinct processes of change 
of the initially produced object-microstate msG, corresponding to two clearly distinct measurement 
interactions M(X) and M(X') realized by use of two distinct apparatuses A(X) and A(X') tied with two 
different mechanical quantities X and X', in general cover two different space-time domains. When this 
happens, the corresponding measurement-interactions M(X) and M(X') cannot be both simultaneously 
achieved for one single replica of a microstate msG. So – in this sense – these two measurement 
interactions are mutually incompatible12. Furthermore, a measurement evolution in general destroys 
the micro-state msG initially produced by the corresponding operation of generation G. It follows that 
if one wants to obtain for the microstate msG observable qualifications in terms of values of both 
quantities X and X', in general one has to generate more than only one replica of msG, because one has 
to achieve the two different sorts of successions 
[(a given operation G of generation of a microstate msG),(a measurement-interaction on msG)] 
– in short [G.M(X)] – namely successions [G.M(X)] as well as successions [G.M(X')] (the chronometer 
being re-set at the same initial time-value to for each realization of a succession of this kind.  
Furthermore, the measurement-interaction for only one quantity X, with a given microstate msG, 
when it is repeated via the corresponding succession [G.M(X)] in order to 'verify' its result, in general 
does not yield systematically one same value Xj. If this does happen for some given quantity X, then it 
does not happen for a quantity X' that is incompatible with X in the sense defined before. This is a fact 
of observation. So, in general, the results are distributed over the whole spectrum {Xj}, j∈J of possible 
values of Xj of the quantity X tied with the test operation X(X) (J: a discrete index set). So the global 
observational situation which emerges by measurement interactions with microstates is quite 
essentially statistical. And the nature of this statistical character is primordial13 in the sense that it 
marks the very first knowledge that can be generated concerning microstates (MMS [2007C] (in 
connection with Longo [2007])), so concerning matter. Therefore – on this level of conceptualization 
itself – this statistical character cannot be assigned to mere ignorance of a more basic 
conceptualization that would have been achievable previously in individual deterministic terms, at 
least in principle (as it is always assumed in classical thinking concerning any sort of statistical data). 
Only by models possibly constructible some day on a higher level of conceptualization could a fully 
non statistical description of this or that microstate be worked out. The chronology of the levels of 
conceptualization begins with a non removable, essential, primordial statistical character. 
                                                 
11
 The ERRATUM joint to the quoted work (see the bibliography) should be taken into account. 
12
 The restriction to one replica of the considered microstate msG is not explicitly required inside the current presentations of the quantum 
mechanical concepts of incompatibility and of complementarity, though they these concepts do involve it.  
13
 'Primordial' in the sense that it yields the very first observable data that can be generated concerning the studied microstate. 
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III.3.3. The peculiar descriptional form tied with primordially statistical transferred qualifications 
So the sort of stability that can be observed concerning a microstate – that one which can be 
researched on the primordial level itself of the conceptualization of microstates – can equally be only 
statistical. On this primordial level one can research a descriptional invariant only by repeating, for 
each given pair (G,X) the corresponding succession [G.M(X)]. If the number N of such repetitions is 
sufficiently large, each one among the possible values from the spectrum {Xj},  j∈J of the involved 
quantity X is realized some number of times n(G,Xj), so with a relative frequency n(G,Xj)/N. And an 
observable invariant can be found only concerning the set {n(G,Xj)/N}, j∈J of all such relative 
frequencies.  
But which sort of invariant, exactly? 
The first tendency is to answer: «a probabilistic invariant, a probability law {p(G,Xj)}, j∈J tied 
with the pair (G,X)». But this brings us back to the problem brought into evidence in the chapter II, of 
the absence of a factual definition of the 'probability law' to be asserted in a given factual 'probabilistic 
situation', that be independent from that one – non effective and circular – that is involved in the 
theorem of large numbers.  
We are here in presence of the most basic manifestation of Kolmogorov's aporia that has been 
formulated first inside the classical thinking.  
This most basic manifestation of Kolmogorov's aporia might come out to definitively exclude 
any solution worked out at the level of conceptualization where quantum mechanics is formulated, 
because of the primordially statistical nature of the descriptions of microstates that are placed on this 
level14.  
So all that, for the moment, can be factually achieved, is what follows. To realize for each 
studied pair (G,X), a finite number q of series of N repetitions of the corresponding succession 
[G.M(X)], N taking on successively the values from some finite collection of increasingly large 
numbers N1, N2,….Nk…Nq, and to survey whether yes or not some tendency of convergence does 
manifest itself for the relative frequencies from the obtained sets {n(G,Xj)/N}, j∈J, N=N1, 
N2,….Nk…Nq. Nothing insures a priori the existence of such a convergence.  
This existence is not a logical necessity. And if no convergence were found, one would be 
obliged to finally give up the aim to construct some stable observable knowledge concerning 
microstates. But in fact it turns out that a tendency toward convergence does manifest itself, for any 
pair (G,X); a fluctuating convergence, of course, as long as the integer Nq is kept definite, finite, 
effective. In these conditions, and given the confinement inside effective procedures that has been 
decided here and the absence so far of any general procedure for constructing the factual probability 
law to be asserted in a given factual situation, one can only substitute some posit to the specification of 
such a law. For instance, one can posit that the relative frequencies from the set {n(G,Xj)/N}, j∈J, 
measured for the longest series of repetitions, Nq, of the succession [G.M(X)], will be assimilated by 
convention to the unknown factual numerical distribution of individual probabilities. Which amounts 
to just decide to write {n(G,Xj)/Nq} ≅ {p(G,Xj)}, j∈J, i.e. to assign to the ration n(G,Xj)/Nq, j∈J the 
role played in the theorem of large numbers by what there is denoted p(ej). Thereby one introduces 
concerning the microstate msG a sort of 'pre-probabilistic knowledge' founded on a mere factually 
observed tendency toward convergence, which, under cover of the dense cloud of confusion which 
surrounds the concept of probability, is treated by convention as a factual 'probabilistic' knowledge15. 
Namely, in this case, a pre-probabilistic qualification marked by a non removable relativity to the 
involved triad (G,msG,M(X)). This sort of transferred pre-probabilistic qualification, involving a 
                                                 
14
 Inside the mathematical quantum theory it is largely admitted more or less explicitly that the mathematical formalism permits to 
determine the probability law corresponding to ANY factual situation concerning a microstate. Historically, this view stems from what is 
called 'Born's algorithm' and possibly also from Gleason's theorem on 'probability' measures in a Hilbert space (Gleason [1957]). We will not 
discuss here this view which the present author does not share. We only mention it in order to submit it for discussion, noting that it is far 
from being unanimously regarded as an established view, as it can be found out by reading a number of works where it is variously tried to 
justify it (Destouches-Février [1946], Ballentine [1973], Deutch [1999], Anandan [20002], and others). But it might come out that, for 
definitive reasons of principle, a justification be conceivable only inside some future modelization in classical terms, of the primordial 
transferred quantum mechanical descriptions. 
15
 After all – for now – something of this same sort is what is also systematically done in any classical probabilistic situation, more or less 
explicitly.  
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conventional choice, is called here the transferred description of the microstate msGսG via the 
qualifying 'transfer-view' V(X) and it is denoted  
D/G,msG,V(X)/ 
This notation reminds explicitly of the genesis of this description and the relativities which it involves 
('transfer-view' V(X) is just a new name and notation introduced for the measurement interaction 
M(X)). But let us stress again that the description itself – the global qualification that has been 
constructed – consists of nothing more than the partially conventional pre-probability law 
{n(G,Xj)/Nq} ≅ {p(G,Xj)}, j∈J introduced above. 
We have explicitly noted that the strategy imposed by the cognitive situation while constructing 
knowledge concerning microstates has led to observable qualifications that can be posited only to 
involve this microstate, but cannot be assigned to it alone. This might seem to already violate the 
classical concept of description. So let us investigate whether at least the peculiar sort of knowledge 
constructed here and denoted D/G,msG,V(X)/, can be considered to be characteristic of the involved 
microstate msG, i.e. whether it can be considered to involve exclusively the microstate msG. Now, the 
answer to this question is negative: no reason can be found for asserting that the same pre-probability 
law {p(G,Xj))}, j∈J that has been found for the studied microstate msG, so for the pair (G,Xj)), could 
never arise for also another pair (G',X) with G'≠G and the same qualifying quantity X.   
But if one considers two mutually non compatible measurement-interactions M(X) and M(X') 
achieved on different replicas of one same microstate msG, then it seems safe enough to consider that 
these act as two distinct 'directions of qualification' which together, by a sort of 'intersection', do 
determine a characterization of msG; i.e. that no other operation of generation which is different from 
G can generate a microstate for which exactly the same pair of pre-probability laws as those obtained 
for msGսG with M(X) and M(X'), does emerge. All the more so, then, if all the mutually non-
compatible pairs (G,X) are considered, where X runs over all the mechanical quantities redefined for a 
microstate: the set of all the pre-probability laws p(G,X) corresponding to all these mutually non 
compatible pairs can quite safely be considered to express a specificity of the studied microstate msG. 
So let us call it 'the' pre-probabilistic transferred description of the microstate msG (mind the 




designates 'the global mechanical qualifying view defined for microstates' consisting of the 
union V=∪V(X) with X running over all the qualifying mechanical quantities defined for microstates.  
Thereby the initial descriptional form D/G,msG,V(X(X))/ which cannot be considered yet to fully 
characterize one given microstate, has been developed into a relativized description D/G,msG,V/ by 
which such a characterization is achieved. 
So a transferred description of a microstate msG consists of, exclusively, a set of one or several 
partially conventional pre-probability 'laws' on the spectrum of groups of observable marks {µX} 
transferred on various registering devices of various apparatuses and expressed via coding rules in 
terms of values Xj of qualifying mechanical quantities X.  Such a description asserts strictly nothing 
concerning how the microstate msG 'is' itself, nor even where and when it 'is':  
No connected space-time support is assigned to the studied microstate msG by its transferred 
description D/G,msG,V/.  
This, together with the involved coding which is stripped of any semantic content, makes the 
transferred description D/G,msG,V/ utterly unintelligible. Thereby it violently calls for an 'explanation',  
for a model of the microstate msG, in the classical sense, i.e. in terms of 'intrinsic' space-time 
qualifications of msG associated with other non-transferred, intrinsic values of  intrinsic qualifying 
aspects ('hidden parameters').  
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III.3.4. The global space-time tree-like structure of the transferred description of a microstate  
Let us come back now to the space-time mutual incompatibilities which exclude the 
simultaneous realization – on one single replica of the microstate msG – of different measurement-
interactions M(X) that are mutually incompatible. These incompatibilities entail that the set of all the 
physical successions [G.M(X)] which involve one same operation of generation G, falls apart into a 
subset of mutually in-compatible classes of mutually compatible successions [G.M(X)]. This, by a 
'geometrizing' process of integration, brings forth a pre-probabilistic whole of a new type, with a tree-
like space-time structure founded on one common 'trunk' corresponding to the space-time domain 
dG(tG-to) covered by all the realizations of the operation of generation G, and possessing as many 
measurement-interaction 'branches' as there are mutually incompatible classes of mutually compatible 
operations of the considered sort, each branch covering a specific space-time domain and generating 
on its top a corresponding Kolmogorov-type pre-probability space16. We shall call this structure the 
pre-probability tree of the pair (G,V) and denote it by the symbol T(G,V) where V is the utilized view. 
The fig.1 represents an example with only two branches corresponding to only two quantities re-
noted for simplicity X≡ B and X≡ C and topped by, respectively, the two pre-probability spaces  
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(The algebra on the universes of elementary events (C1, C2, C3,...Ck,...Cm) is skipped for the sake of 
simplicity and the pre-probability law {p(G,C)} is defined directly on the universe of elementary 
events; mutatis mutandis the same is done for the universe (B1, B2, B3,....Bj,...) and p(G,B) ).  
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 These space-time specifications from the 'geometrizing' integration of the genesis of a transferred description D/G,msG,V/ do not in the 
least alter the fact that any own, intrinsic space-time specification of  the microstate msG, is lacking.   
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III.3.5. Necessity of a deepened and extended theory of probabilities  
We have shown elsewhere that the qualitative descriptional form D/G,msG,V/ with the tree-like 
space-time structure T(G,V) of its whole integrated, 'geometrized' genesis, introduces a number of 
characters which overflow Kolmogorov's classical concept of a probability space, quite essentially and 
in several important respects, namely: full representation of the structure of the involved random 
phenomenon; meta-probabilistic-dependence between the events from the mutually incompatible 
probability spaces which top the branches (accepting a specific mathematical representation not 
singularized before inside the general concept of correlated probabilistic spaces); pre-organized 
receptivity for also the logical aspects of the set of all the involved elementary events and events, 
whether compatible or incompatible, and which come out not to be expressible by a lattice structure). 
Thereby the concept of probability tree of the pair (G,V) calls for an extended and deepened theory of 
probabilities unified with a corresponding logic of all the involved events. This has been achieved in 
MS [1992A], [2002A], [2002B], [2006]. 
III.3.7. Conclusion on infra-quantum mechanics (IQM)  
The descriptional form D/G,msG,V/ with the geometrized, integrated tree-like space-time 
structure of its genesis and the consequences of it, is the heart of the strictly qualitative, physical-
epistemological sort of representation of microstates constructed independently of the mathematical 
formalism of quantum mechanics and called infra-quantum mechanics, in short IQM ('infra' is to be 
understood here as: beneath the mathematical formalism and partially encrypted in it).  
Here infra-quantum mechanics has been only sketched in a very simplified way. But when it is 
exposed in full detail it brings into light the whole way in which the quantum theory manages to 
signify. In particular, it permits to separate inside quantum mechanics that which has been introduced 
there by prolongation of classical models aimed toward the construction of, specifically, a mechanics 
of microstates, from what has been induced there exclusively by the cognitive situation, by the general 
requirements of human conceptualization, and by the aim to construct knowledge concerning 
microstates.  
Notice however that, notwithstanding the elements of classical models encrypted in its 
formalism, the descriptions of microstates from the quantum theory are transferred descriptions of the 
form D/G,msG,V/ identified inside IMQ, involving the thetree-like space-time structure T(G,V).  
A systematic comparison between infra-quantum mechanics and the mathematical formalism of 
quantum mechanics should now permit to deal in a unified coherent manner with all the interpretation 
problems, and to achieve an organized dissolution of these.  
But this remains exterior to the present context. The own aim of the present work is to identify 
the factual probability law to be asserted in any given factual probabilistic situation.  
From the chapter II and from what precedes inside this chapter it appeared that the problem of 
defining a factual probability law in any given probabilistic situation stays open as much in the 
classical probabilistic thinking as in the case of the primordially statistical transferred descriptions of 
microstates that lie at the basis of the whole nowadays physical knowledge. And it seems worth 
announcing immediately that it is precisely by the use of a generalization of the descriptional form 
D/G,msG,V/ constructed concerning inside infra-quantum mechanics for the particular case of 
microstates, that we will be able to enter upon this gaping problem that vitiates the probabilistic 
conceptualization. In order to introduce the mentioned generalization we shall now first bring into 
evidence a certain universal character involved by the descriptional form D/G,msG,V/.  
III.4. Universality and the possibility of a general method of conceptualization 
So, to achieve a description D/G,msG,V/ of a microstate it is necessary to: 
(a) achieve the epistemic operation denoted G that introduces a corresponding object-entity-of-
description msG, independently (in general) of any epistemic action by which this entity could be 
qualified; 
(b)  achieve the measurement-interactions M(X) that lead to qualifications of the entity msG;    
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(c)  realize both operations G and M(X(X)) in a radically creative way, by first generating – 
physically, in space-time – an object-entity-of-description that did not pre-exist (instead of just 
selecting it among already available physical objects) and afterward generating, physically again, 
observable manifestations of msG (instead of just detecting properties supposed to pre-existing and to 
be possessed by this entity); 
(d) realize a big number of times each succession [G.M(X)] for each quantity X involved by the 
utilized view V, in order to try to reach – on the level of observable manifestations of msG which 
irrepressibly arises with a statistical nature – an invariant able to constitute a qualification 
characteristic of msG and endowed with an acceptably degree of stability. 
The points (a)-(d) summarize a maximally displayed and creative way of achieving descriptions, 
where all the involved relativities are active and obvious and the resulting descriptional form 
D/G,msG,V/ is explicitly relativized to each one of the elements of the triad (G, msG, V)17.  
It is crucial to realize that such a degree of display and creativity is ignored in most of our 
current classical conceptualizations such as they are reflected by the natural languages as well as by 
classical logic, classical probabilities and classical physical theories, Einstein's relativity included. In 
the classical conceptualizations it has always been possible to suppose more or less implicitly that the 
considered object-entities-of-description pre-exist to the descriptional process and are 'defined' in 
advance by 'properties' which they 'possess' intrinsically, independently of any act of examination, and 
in an already actualized way. As long as the peculiar aim of describing microstates had not yet been 
conceived, these suppositions had never led to noticed difficulties. Therefore, classically, a description 
is conceived to consist exclusively in the detection of one or more among the properties possessed by 
the object-entity-of-description which itself pre-exists either as an 'object' in the usual sense, or as a 
'situation', etc. The question of how an object-entity-of-description is introduced as such is entirely 
skipped. As for the process of examination that creates a qualification of this entity, it is contracted 
into one static act of mere detection. This last classical contraction is the source of the nowadays most 
explicitly stated differences between the logic and probabilities of the descriptions of microstates, and 
on the other hand the classical logic and probabilities. But the very deep consequences of the way in 
which an object-entity-of-description is generated, are quasi systematically ignored18.            
It is however noteworthy that, while in classical logic and probabilities – the two most 
fundamental classical syntactical structures – the descriptional form D/G,msG,V/ is not apparent, this 
form nevertheless is explicitly involved in many classical and quite current epistemic procedures. 
Indeed, once one has clearly perceived the peculiar and very difficult cognitive situation dealt with for 
describing microstates, as well as the descriptional strategy that permitted to dominate this difficult 
cognitive situation, a very paradoxical inversion arises, by a sudden variation that reminds of those 
which make appear certain drawings of a cube as sometimes convex and sometimes concave. What 
first, in D/G,msG,V/, had seemed to be fundamentally new and surprising, abruptly appears now on the 
contrary as endowed with a certain sort of universality, so of normality. Indeed it leaps to one's mind 
that: 
* any explicit and full account of a given process of description has to include specification of 
the action by which the object-entity-of-description is introduced as such, as well as specification of 
the operation, physical or abstract or both, by which a qualification is obtained for this object-entity;  
* often the above mentioned two actions are mutually independent;  
* the introduction of the object-entity-of-description is sometimes achieved by creation of this 
entity, while the operation of qualification, if it is a physical process, always – in principle at least – 
changes the object-entity, and sometimes radically, in which cases the consequences of the relativity 
to one or the other or both these basic epistemic actions, upon the obtained description, have to be 
explicitly taken into account and thoroughly analyzed. 
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 It might seem at a first sight that the relativity to msG can be absorbed in that to G. But this cannot be done: the results of the 
successions [G.M(X)] depend explicitly on msG and they cannot be derived from G. 
18
 This is so even in fundamental quantum mechanics: there, for verbal reasons, many physicists identify erroneously the operation G of 
generation of a microstate, with what is called 'preparation' of the microstate, which in fact is involved only in the operation of qualification 
of that microstate via measurement-interactions. This amounts to presupposing that the microsystem to be qualified is already there. In any 
case, the operations of generation of microstates are not mathematically represented inside the formalism.  
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For instance, think of a detective who is searching for material indications concerning a crime. 
What does he do? He usually focuses his attention on a convenient place from the physical reality, say 
the theatre of a crime, and there he first operates extraction of some samples (he cuts out fragments of 
cloth, he detaches a clot of coagulated blood, etc.); or he might even entirely create a test-situation 
involving the suspects, and insure registration of their behavior. Only afterward does he examine the 
gathered samples or, respectively, the behaviors registered during the test-situation.  
One can equally think of a biopsy for a medical diagnosis, or an extraction of samples of rock 
operated by a robot on the surface of another planet, and the subsequent examinations of these entities-
to-be-described. In all these cases the observer-conceptor – more or less radically – generates an 
object-entity-of-description that did not pre-exist in the desired state or quantity, in order to qualify it 
later by operations that are quite independent of the operation which generated these entities. And in 
certain cases the operation of examination so radically changes the object-entity, that, if several 
different examinations of this object-entity are necessary, also several replicas of it must be produced. 
Furthermore, the obtained qualifications arise marked indelibly by two quite distinct relativities: a 
relativity to the way of generating the object-entity-of-description (this way can simply exclude certain 
subsequent examinations), and also a relativity to the sort of examination that has been achieved. 
These considerations call forth the following remarks. 
In the first place, the nature and realm assigned by classical thinking, to communicable 
knowledge, are misleadingly reduced. The whole primordial zone of conceptualization where mind 
actively constructs, out of pure factuality, the very first forms of a radically new communicable 
knowledge, is so deep-set, that it remained hidden beneath the two basic building blocks of all the 
current occidental languages, namely subjects and predicates. These do both suggest available, pre-
existing elements for describing. Furthermore, the primordial, always radically creative zone of 
conceptualization remained cut off even from many classical scientific representations. 
Notwithstanding the well known analyzes of Husserl, Poincaré, Einstein, Piaget, and many others, not 
only classical logic and probabilities, but also the set theory (hence most domains of modern 
mathematics), modern linguistic and semiotic, etc., take their start from language and by use of – 
quasi-exclusively – language again. Physical operations are not considered. And factuality – via 
language – is widely supposed to spontaneously imprint, upon passively receptive minds, 'information' 
concerning already existing and actual properties of pre-existing objects. The active role, when it does 
come in, is assigned quasi exclusively to the exterior factuality, not to the mind. This attitude, in fact, 
is stronger and more general concerning the object-entities-of-description (grammatical subjects) than 
concerning qualifications (predications). As far as I know, an attempt at an integrated and systematic 
representation of, both, the modalities of emergence of individual object-entities-of-description, and of 
qualifications of these, by deliberate epistemic actions, and the way in which these two sorts of 
descriptional elements can be integrated into communicable and regulated procedures, has never been 
made by another author. 
Quantum mechanics, by having suggested the construction of infra-quantum mechanics which 
led to the identification of the relativized descriptional form D/G,msG,V/, brought forth for the first 
time the potentiality of a most deep-set general operational method of relativized conceptualization; a 
general method founded on the very first interplay of what is called mind, with an entirely unknown 
physical factuality and that involves explicitly all the successive 'local' descriptional aims to be 
achieved, all the physical operations and devices that come in, as well as the evolving stratum of pre-
existing conceptualization.  
Indeed, the descriptional form D/G,msG,V/ is paradigmatic.  
This is so because it has captured in it a particular embodiment of an extreme epistemic 
situation that is universal. Namely the situation that arises each time that a communicable and 
consensual representation is researched concerning some non pre-existing physical entity of which – a 
priori – only the possibility is conceived and labeled, and which, if then effectively generated, emerges 
non-perceivable. In such extreme circumstances one is compelled to a radically active, constructive 
attitude, associated with a maximal decomposition of the global process. All the stages of the desired 
description have to be built out of pure physical factuality, independently of one another, each one in 
full depth and extension. The severity of these constraints revealed a descriptional form D/G,msG,V/ so 
exhaustive and explicit that any other more particular form of description must somehow find lodging 
in it. This is why this form D/G,msG,V/ possesses a universal epistemological value. 
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As soon as this universal epistemological value of the descriptional form D/G,msG,V/ has been 
understood, a new aim becomes conceivable : to construct a consensual canonical method of 
conceptualizing endowed by construction with the capacity to exclude a priori any possibility of 
paradoxes and false problems. Our natural way of conceptualizing incorporates quite currently seeds 
of problems and paradoxes which, when they bloom, block the understanding, sometimes for a very 
long time. If it were possible to discern whether a given process of conceptualization – not only of 
deduction, but quite generally of conceptualization – is 'well formed' accordingly to some explicit 
consensual standard, or whether on the contrary it is flawed by some genetic malformation wherefrom 
false problems or paradoxes can emerge, it would become possible to indefinitely develop 'clean' 
conceptual structures, able to carry safely and swiftly the human mind along any path of investigation 
or creation. Such a canonical form should consist of precisely a most displayed and explicit 
descriptional structure, with maximally carved out capacities. For it has to be a void form, a mould, 
able to offer an available, specific, and sufficiently large location, for each main stage of any 
descriptional process. In this or that given description, one or more locations offered by this canonical 
form might remain partially or totally unutilized. But this, if it happens, would be known, since the 
form will exhibit a labeled void of which the ampleness can be estimated. For instance, if I say «I 
consider what I see just in front of my eyes and this is a red surface», by reference to the maximally 
complete descriptional mould D/G,msG,V/ it will appear that in this case the two canonically distinct 
descriptional actions, of generation of the object-entity-of-description, and of qualification of this 
entity, have coalesced in the unique act of looking-just-in-front-of-my-eyes, which both delimits and 
qualifies the object-entity. So in this case the location reserved for the stage of independent generation 
of an object-entity-of-description remains entirely void. It will also be possible to estimate the 
magnitude of only partial voids and to draw consequences. For instance, imagine the assertion «I 
plucked this flower, I examined its morphology with a microscope, and the result is this». Comparison 
with the canonical mould brings forth that this amounts to a description where the object-entity is 
introduced – as such – by an only partially creative action (plucking a flower) while the act of 
examination might only very little change the object-entity initially introduced in this way. So in this 
case the two distinct locations reserved in the canonical mould in view of a possibly radical creativity 
in both the stage of production of an object-entity-of-description and in that of qualification of this 
entity, are both made use of, but each one to only a very reduced degree. So we know that a classical 
treatment (assuming the pre-existence of the object-entity-of-description as well as its invariance with 
respect to the process of qualification) can be posited to produce a very good approximation to the 
result that would be obtained by a complete canonical treatment. 
III.5. The Method of Relativized Conceptualization 
The goal of the method of relativized conceptualization (MRC) is to offer a structure of norms of 
conceptualization which exclude by construction the possibility of emergence of any false problems or 
paradoxes. MRC achieves this goal via a systematic relativization of each step of conceptualization. 
The method has been constructed starting from zero. It has been developed in a deductive way. The 
descriptional strategy explicated inside infra-quantum mechanics for the particular case of microstates 
played the role of a guide. The progressive relativizations introduced with utmost detail along the 
whole process that leads from a zero-point of conceptualization, to any conceptual system, no matter 
how complex, protect this whole process from any surreptitious insertion of false absolutes. These 
relativizations, on their trajectory, produce a general equivalent, denoted D/G,œG,V/, of the 
descriptional form D/G,msG,V/. The form D/G,œG,V/ recurs then at all the descriptional levels, like a 
fractal character. So hierarchical chains of relativized descriptions can be constructed, and nets of such 
chains. Along the mentioned path MRC achieves, in particular, 'clean' reconstructions of natural logic, 
of syntactic systems, of the probabilistic conceptualization, of the informational conceptualization.          
In what follows we introduce only an enumeration (as opposed to 'construction') of those 
features of MRC that will be made use of in the following chapter19.   
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(1)  MRC is founded upon a systematic relativization of any description, to a triad (G,œG ,V) 
where G denotes the operation of generation – physical, or abstract or consisting of some combination 
of physical and abstract operational elements – by which the object-entity is made available as such 
for being qualified ; œG denotes the object-entity itself introduced by G ; V denotes the view by which 
the object-entity is qualified.  
(2) Any description is denoted by the symbol D/G,œG ,V/ that points toward explicitly toward the 
non removable relativities to the particular triad (G,œG ,V) that is involved. 
(3) A one-to-one relation G↔œG   is posited between the operation of generation G and the 
object-entity œG  introduced by G. This is a methodological posit, not a fact. But upon very careful 
analysis it has been found that, concerning the descriptions of microstates, this posit imposes itself 
inescapably. And a very attentive subsequent examination established that – if one wants to erect a 
method of conceptualizing that indeed banishes a priori any insertion of false absolutes – this 
methodological posit also imposes itself inescapably with full generality inside the whole class of first-
stratum descriptions of any nature. Precisely this inescapable character of a one-to-one relation 
G↔œG  entails major conceptual consequences concerning the 'primordial' sort of statistical character 
brought in by first-stratum, 'transferred' descriptions ((MS [2006] pp.61-66 and 213-221, [2008], 
[2009]). 
(4) Any view V is endowed by definition with a strictly prescribed structure:  
- A view V is a finite set of aspect-views Vg where g is an aspect-index.  
- An aspect-view Vg (in short : an aspect g) is a semantic dimension of qualification (colour, 
weight, etc.) able to carry any finite20 set of 'values' (gk) of the aspect g which one wishes to consider 
(for instance for 'colour' one can choose to consider only the 'values of colour' indicated by the words 
'red', 'yellow', 'green' to each one of which is associated a sample ; the bracket surrounding gk shows 
that this symbol functions like a unique index different from g alone ; in a definite case the indexes g 
and (gk) can be replaced by any other pair of convenient signs). An aspect-view Vg is defined if and 
only if are defined all the devices (instruments, apparatuses) as well as all the material or abstract 
operations on which is based the assertion that an examination of a given object-entity via the aspect-
view Vg, has yielded this or that – unique and definite – value (gk) of g (or none).  
- A view V is a finite filter for qualification: with respect to aspect, or values of aspects that are 
not contained in it by its initially posited definition, a given view V is blind, it does not perceive them.  
- The qualifications of space and time are achieved via a very particular sort of frame-views 
V(ET) (reducible, if convenient, to only a space-frame-view V(E) or only a time-frame-view V(T)).  
(5) Given a pair (G,Vg), the two epistemic operators G and Vg can mutually exist, or not. If any 
examination by Vg of the object-entity œG introduced by the object-entity generator G produces one 
well defined result (gk), then the aspect-value (gk) of g does exist with respect to G, i.e. there is mutual 
existence between G and (gk); hence, a fortiori, there also is mutual existence between the aspect g 
itself and the operation of generation G. In this case the pair (G,Vg) constitutes an epistemic 
referential. This means that in this case, if one applies to the object-entity œG introduced by G, an 
examination by Vg, so if one produces the operational succession [G.Vg], then one might obtain a 
corresponding "description" of œG via the grid for qualification consisting of the aspect-view Vg. This 
happens indeed only if by repetitions of the succession [G.Vg] there does emerge some invariant 
result, either an individual invariant or a 'probabilistic' one (though what that means factually is 
precisely what remains to be specified in this work).   
If on the contrary, what is defined to be an examination by Vg, when applied to the object-entity 
œG, yields no definite result, then there is no mutual existence between Vg of œG (œG does not exist 
relatively to Vg and vice versa) (for instance, a song does not exist with respect to a grid for qualifying 
in terms of intensity-values of an electrical current, and vice versa). In this case the initial matching 
(G,Vg) has to be eliminated a posteriori as unable to generate a relative description D/G,œG ,Vg/ (non 
significant from a descriptional point of view).  
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 By construction, every counting or numerical character involved in MRC is finite: MRC is conceived as a strictly effective method. Inside 
MRC any sort of infinity can be understood only in terms of relativized absences of a priori limitation. 
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The concept of mutual existence of an operation of generation G of an entity-to-be-described œG  
and an aspect-view Vg, is the MRC-expression of the fact that the aspect g has emerged by abstraction 
from a class of entities to which œG  does belong; while mutual in-existence between œG  and Vg is the 
MRC-expression of the fact that the entity œG  does not belong to the class just specified: the pair of 
concepts of mutual existence and mutual inexistence constitutes the MRC-expression of the fact that a 
qualification can be applied only to the entities that have participated to the (social, statistical) 
genesis of this qualification. 
These considerations can be extended in an obvious way to also any pair (G,V) where V=∪Vg 
contains a finite number of aspect-views Vg. In this case one speaks of the possibility, or not, of an 
epistemic referential (G,V). 
(6) The space-time frame-principle asserts what follows concerning – specifically – physical 
object-entities.  
Any physical object-entity does exist relatively to at least one aspect-view Vg that is different 
from any space-time frame-view V(ET); but it is non-existent with respect to any space-time 
frame view V(ET) considered alone, separately from any aspect-view Vg different from any 
space-time aspect ET.  
Consider then a physical object-entity œG generated by a physical operation G: in consequence 
of the space-time frame-principle, the view V from any epistemic referential (G,V) able to generate a 
description of a physical object-entity-to-be-described must include a space-time frame-aspect V(ET) 
as well as at least one aspect-view Vg different from any space-time aspect ET21  
 (7) Consider a pair (G,Vg) where G and Vg do mutually exist. So the pairing (G,Vg) does 
constitute an epistemic referential where it is possible to construct a relative description of the object-
entity-to-be-describe œG produced by G. Let us denote this description by D/G,œG ,Vg/.  
If after some number N of repetitions of the succession [G.Vg]22 only one and the same value 
(gk) of the aspect g is systematically obtained, the corresponding relative description D/G,œG ,Vg/ is 
said to be 'N-individual' (an 'individual description' relatively to N repetitions of [G.Vg]), N being 
finite.  
If on the contrary the obtained value (gk) in general varies from one realization of the succession 
[G.Vg] to another one, the corresponding relative description D/G,œG ,Vg/ is statistical, so via a very 
large but finite number N' of series of N repetitions of [G.Vg] it can only '(N-N')-point toward' a 
probabilistic description D/G,œG ,Vg/ (cf. MS [2002B] pp. 145-147, [2006] pp. 75-78). But the 
specification of the conditions in which a factual 'probabilistic' invariant associated with the epistemic 
referential (G,Vg), does 'exist' and furthermore can be identified by some effective procedure, is 
precisely the aim of this work. As long as the question of an effective specification of a factual 
numerical probability distribution associable to a factual probabilistic situation is not yet solved, one 
can only speak statistical descriptions endowed with '(N-N')-stability. (This is an illustration of the 
way in which inside MCR all the involved concepts are kept rigorously effective). 
The preceding assertions can be generalized to the case that the utilized view V contains more 
than only one aspect-view Vg: one has then to realize – separately, in general – repetitions of all the 
sequences of operations [G.Vg] for all the aspect-views Vg fro V. The whole of all the final 
qualifications thus obtained will be denoted D/G,œG ,V/. This description, if some stability of this 
whole manifests itself, can again be found to an individual relative description, or a statistical relative 
description endowed with an '(N-N')-stability' 
Let us now add a remark of crucial importance concerning the concept of relativized description. 
Inside a relative description D/G,œG ,V/, the ‘generator’, the ‘object-entity-of-description, and the 
view, are not fixed entities, they are descriptional ROLES freely assigned by the observer-conceptor to 
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via Vg, or it is destroyed (absorbed in a device, etc.). So in general repetitions of [G.Vg] require repetitions of also the generation operation 
G (creation of a new replica of œG). 
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this or that entity, accordingly to his own descriptional aims: the entity which in one description holds 
the role of the view, in another relative description can be put in the role of object-entity-of-
description or of operation of generation. This sort of freedom – characteristic of formalized 
representations – is the source of the unrestricted applicability of MRC to any process of 
conceptualization that is subject to the constraint of excluding by construction any false absolute.   
 (8) A view V is by construction a union of a finite number m of aspect-views Vg, we can write 
V=∪gVg, g=1,2...m. Each aspect-view Vg introduces a semantic g-axis that carries its 'values' (gk), 
k=1,2,...w(g) where w(g) is by construction an integer that depends on g. So V introduces by 
construction the abstract representation space defined by the set of these m semantic g-axes. It follows 
that:  
Any relative description D/G,œG ,V/ consists of a cloudy structure, a 'points-form' of (gk)-value-
points with g=1,2...m,  k=1,2,...w(g) contained in the m-dimensional representation-space of the 
view V which it introduces. 
 If the object-entity œG  is of a physical nature, one must add inside V a 4-dimensional discreet 
space-time view V(ET) and then the relative description D/G,œG ,V/ becomes a cloudy structure or 
'form' of space-time-(gk)-value-points with g=1,2...m,  k=1,2,...w(g), and x,y,z,t, some finite space-
time grid upon which the units of space and time impose a discrete set of possible space-time values, 
this whole form being contained in the (m+4)-dimensional representation-space now introduced by the 
view V23.   
 (9) One can form chains of relativized descriptions connected via common elements in their 
respective object-entities œG , (so in their involved operations of generation G) or in their views V. 
Along such a chain there exists a descriptional hierarchy or order : in general the order 1 is 
conventionally assigned to the first description from that chain ; the second description connected to 
the first one is then of order 2 with respect to this first description (a meta-description 24 with respect 
to the first one) ; the third description is assigned the order 3 and it is a meta-description with respect 
to the description of order 2 and a meta-meta-description with respect to the first description from the 
chain). Etc. So in general the order of a description inside a chain is relative to the process of 
construction of the chain.  
But consider the case of a chain of descriptions that starts with a 'basic', first-stratum, 
'transferred' description of a type that generalizes the descriptional type explicated for microstates in 
the chapter III; namely, a description in which the operation of generation creates an object-entity that 
has never been examined before and of which the observable manifestations – for some non-restricted 
reason – cannot be directly observed (for instance, the chemical structure of a sample of rock 
dislocated by a robot sent on the moon which is equipped with apparatuses able to identify chemical 
structure and to transmit the result on a computer screen from an laboratory on earth-laboratory). In 
such a case: 
The initial basic transferred description determines an absolute beginning of a particular 
process of construction of knowledge. To express this, the order 0 – in an absolute sense – is 
assigned to it. 
(10) Passage from a given description from a chain of descriptions, to the following one, is 
commanded by the principle of separation PS, in the following sense.  
Each relative description D/G,œG ,V/ is accomplished inside an epistemic referential (G,V) where 
G – in consequence of the methodologically posited one-to-one relation G↔œG – is tied to one object-
entity œG and the view V consists of a given finite set of aspect-views Vg each one of which carries a 
finite set of aspect-values (gk). Furthermore the relative description D/G,œG ,V/ is achieved via some 
finite number of realizations of successions [G.Vg]. So a relative description D/G,œG ,V/ is by 
construction a finite 'cell of conceptualization' : if all the aspect-views from the global view V have 
been taken into account, and each one with all its values gk, and after the realization of some 
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 In logic the verbal particle 'meta' indicates an imbedding language, so it is conceived as placed 'under' the studied language. Here, on the 
contrary, 'meta' is deliberately assigned the significance of 'after'-and-connected-with. 
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arbitrarily large but finite number of successions [G.Vg] achieved for all the aspect-views Vg from V a 
descriptional invariant has been found, thereby the descriptional resources from the epistemic 
referential (G,V) have been entirely EXHAUSTED. Then, if one wants to obtain some new knowledge 
not already obtained by D/G,œG ,V/, one has to bring in another convenient epistemic referential 
(G',V'), different from (G,V) by G'≠G or by V'≠V, or by both, and to construct inside (G',V') the new 
relative description (D/G',œG' ,V'/) corresponding to the new descriptional aim. Now: 
The methodological principle of separation PS requires that this new description (D/G,œG ,V/) be 
always achieved by a process explicitly and entirely separated from the descriptional process 
that led to D/G,œG ,V/.  
Thereby any uncontrolled coalescence or confusion between the aims and the geneses concerning two 
distinct relative descriptions is systematically avoided. 
(11) Frequently, in a chain that starts with a basic transferred description of order 0, in the 
immediately subsequent description of order 1, the first description of order 0 – as a whole – is put in 
the role of object-entity, in order to be qualified by a certain peculiar sort of view that assigns it 
'values' of an 'aspect' of space-time connected support, whereby the unintelligible transferred 
description of order 0 becomes intelligible in the sense that it gains conformity with the space-time 
frame principle (6). A view that generates such conformity is called an intrinsically modeling view. 
The final result of a description of the specified kind, which inside a given chain acquires some order 
l, can be detached from its genesis. This leaves us with a model of classical type – with an 'object' in 
the currents sense – where nothing recalls any more the initial transferred description. The behavior of 
such models can be represented in 'causal' terms, it admits a deterministic principle.   
In this way, inside MRC there emerges a split inside the pool of all the relativized descriptions 
achieved at any given time. Namely, the very first, basic, transferred relative descriptions of absolute 
order 0 from this pool constitute a primordial stratum of conceptualization. And the corresponding 
classical models of the transferred descriptions from the primordial stratum, together with the 
progressively more and more complex forms acquired by them or with their insertions in nets of more 
complex conceptual structures, constitute an evolving classical stratum of conceptualization of 
indefinitely growing thickness.  
Thereby MRC incorporates the famous '[quantum-classic] cut' and explains it inside a 
generalization in terms of a concept of a universal transition '[(transferred descriptions)-(classical 
descriptions)]'.  
 (12) According to MRC any knowledge that can be communicated in a non restricted way, is 
description (the action of 'pointing toward' restricts to real or virtual co-presence inside some 
delimited space-time domain, so do also mimics, emotional sounds, etc.). Only descriptions can be 
unrestrictedly communicable knowledge, not 'facts' which are exterior to any psyche, nor psychic facts 
(emotions, desires, etc.) which are not expressed by some more or less explicit description, verbal or 
of some other constitution. When we say « I know this house » we spell out an illusion, because of 
unawareness or only for the sake of brevity; only the assertion « I know the descriptions (plural) of 
this house » would correctly express the situation toward which we want to point. 
(13) When the concept of probability is re-constructed inside MRC, the elementary events and 
the events from a probability space acquire the conceptual status of relativized descriptions: their 
MRC descriptional status (role) ceases being only that of object-entities-"of-description" œG; it 
becomes that of relative descriptions of object-entities œG. This has come out to be a quite essential 
progress that entails many clarifying consequences as well as a considerable increase of the power of 
discrimination and expression. 
This mere enumeration of the main features from only the kernel of MRC, should suffice for 
finally entering now upon the specific problem raised in this work. 
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IV. CONSTRUCTION INSIDE MCR OF  
AN EFFECTIVE PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING  
FACTUAL NUMERICAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL PROBABILITIES  
IV.1. Games with a parceled painting 
Throughout this chapter IV we place ourselves inside the classical stratum of conceptualization. 
So the imagined object-entities involve 'objects' in the classical sense (dice, apparatuses, tables, 
vehicles, roads, and so forth).  
This preliminary investigation will consist of a succession of examples. These will familiarize 
with the use of MRC.  
By passage from a small obviousness to another small obviousness there finally will emerge a 
novelty: the definition of an effective procedure permitting to research and – in general – to identify an 
open set of relativized factual probability laws that can be asserted in any given factual  probabilistic 
situation.  
  IV.1.1. Relativized parceling and notations 
Consider the puzzle of a painting P representing a landscape, containing 100 square pieces σ. 
Consider also a spatial grid that can be superposed to the integrated solution of the puzzle of P. On this 
grid each square σ is localized by the specification of its two space coordinates (xk,yh) where xk is an 
element from a set of 10 successive equidistant coordinates {xk}, k≡1,2…10 marked on a horizontal 
space axis ox superposed to the lower edge of the painting P, while yh is an element from a set of 10 
successive equidistant coordinates {yh}, h=1,2…10  marked on a vertical space axis oy superposed to 
the vertical left edge of P. The label (x1,y1) indicates the square from the left lower corner of P and the 
left lower corner of this square is the origin 0 of the plane Cartesian system of reference xoy attached 
to the grid superposed to P ; while the pair (x10,y10) indicates the square from the right upper corner of 
P.  
Consider an epistemic referential (GP,V) where : the object-entity generator GP  is a 'selector' that 
selects as an object-entity the integrated solution of the puzzle of the painting P; V is a view which 
consists of three aspect-views defined as follows: 
* A space-frame-view defined as the union V(E)≡V(El)∪V(Eφ) where : V(El) is a frame-view of 
spatial location (l : location) of which the possible values are the 100 pairs of spatial coordinates 
(xk,yh), k=1,2,...10,  h=1,2,...10  (so a square σ examined via the view V(El) leads to the description 
D/Gσ,σ,V(El)/ of spatial location of σ consisting of one among the pairs of coordinates (xk,yh), 
k=1,2,...10, h=1,2,...10) ;  V(Eφ) is a frame-view of spatial form endowed with a very big number of  
'values of form' (this amounts to the introduction of a very small unit of length that permits to 
reproduce satisfactorily any perceivable contour).  
* A colour aspect-view Vc endowed with a set of colour-values rich enough for insuring that a 
relative description D/Gσ,σ,Vc∪V(Eφ)/ yields a form-of-colour which reproduces 'satisfactorily' that 
one perceived on σ by a normal human eye. (However, since everything in the definition of any view 
is by construction discrete and finite while any view acts like a filter, the total number of possible 
distinct 'values-of-colour-form' is discrete and finite). The view Vc∪V(Eφ) can be synthetically 
rewritten as Vc∪V(Eφ)≡Vcφ where Vφ is a view of colour-form.   
With these definitions and notations the description of the integrated puzzle of the painting P 
achieved inside the epistemic referential (GP,V), has to be written as D/GP, P, V(El)∪ Vcφ /.   
Consider now a 'local' epistemic referential (Gσ,V) where Gσ selects as object-entity only one 
square σ while the view V is the same one is in the referential (GP,V). Then a relative description 
corresponding to (Gσ,V) is to be written as D/Gσ,σ,V(El)∪Vcφ/ : it consists of a 'colour-form' covering 
the selected square σ and which is located as indicated by its 'value' (xk,yh) of spatial location.  
Let Vac be a new aspect-view of 'approximate-colour' endowed with q uniform approximate-
colour values j, j=1,2,...q (this square is approximately of this uniform shed of red, that square is 
approximately of this uniform shed of blue, etc.). 
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 If in the local relative description D/Gσ,σ, V(El)∪Vcφ/ of a square σ, the space-location aspect-
view V(El) is suppressed one obtains a local description D/Gσ,σ,Vcφ/ of a square σ achieved inside the 
referential (Gσ,V cφ) where any direct indication of spatial location is filtered out. 
If furthermore, in this new local relative description D/Gσ,σ,Vcφ/, the view of colour-form Vcφ 
is replaced by the view Vac of uniform approximate-colour, the value of colour-form that covered the 
considered square σ is equally filtered out and a new relative description achieved inside the 
referential (Gσ,Vac) arises – to be written as D/Gσ,σ,Vac/ – where, in consequence of the uniformity of 
the approximate-colour values assigned to Vac, one looses now also the perceptibility of any affinity 
or repulsion between the form-of-colour reaching a border of the considered square σ, with respect to 
another form-of-colour reaching another border of another square σ. So one ceases to be able to play 
puzzle with the 100 squares described via exclusively Vac : this time any hint of some connection 
between the considered square σ and the global 'significance' carried by the integrated painting P, is 
lost.  
Suppose now that the global dimensions of the picture P and the distance between two 
successive values of the xk or yh coordinates, are such that:  
(a) Any square σ is small enough for carrying only one approximate-colour-value j. Then its 
relative description D/Gσ,σ, Vac/ via the view Vac of uniform approximate-colour entirely consists of 
only one uniform approximate-colour : it reduces to just its unique approximate-colour value  j.  So we 
can write D/Gσ,σ, Vac/≡Dj, j=1,2,….q. Then we have {D/Gσ,σ,Vac/}≡{Dj}≡{ j},  j=1,2,….q. 
(b) Any given partial description Dj≡ j is realized on much more than only one square from P. 
Thereby, by construction, the cardinal q of the set of mutually different relative descriptions {Dj}≡{j},  
j=1,2,….q  is much smaller than 100. 
So finally, each one among the 100 squares σ can be taken knowledge of via three distinct views 
: the frame-view V(El) of spatial location , the frame-view view of Vcφ of colour-form, and the view 
Vac of uniform approximate-colour.   
Let us now mix the squares and throw them all into a ballot box.  
Starting from this point we define a succession of 'games' which will lead to the announced 
interesting conclusion. 
IV.1.2. Game illustrating the power of reconstruction contained in space (or space-time) order 
Let us accomplish the 100 possible successive extractions of a square σ from the ballot box and 
look at each extracted square via the frame-view V(El) of spatial location. This, for each square, yields 
a description which places each square at the place, on the reference grid subtended by axes xoy, 
which is indicated by the obtained coordinates (xk,yh). Since any view acts as a filter, this happens 
without having taken into account the colour-form carried by it, nor the uniform approximate-colour j 
defined on it by the view Vac. Nevertheless, after exactly 100 extractions, the global painting P is 
reconstructed. Though the order of extraction of the squares will have been random, each individual 
act of progression toward the reconstruction of the global painting P will have been accomplished in a 
way marked by certainty, while the global process will have been finite: the spatial grid of reference 
possesses a power of topological organization which is independent of the 'semantic content' of the 
squares.  
These remarks extend in an obvious way to the case also of a space-time grid. 
IV.1.3. Puzzle with only one replica of P 
Let us now proceed differently. Let us again mix the squares and shed them into the ballot box. 
Let us then make again the 100 possible successive extractions of a square from the ballot box. But 
this time, let us  make use of – exclusively – the view Vcφ of colour-form. So each square is perceived 
by its relative description D/Gσ, σ, Vcφ/. The label of space location (xk,yh) as well as well as its label j 
of uniform approximate-colour are filtered out, they are ignored. In these conditions, again, after 
exactly the 100th extraction the global painting P will be reconstructed. But in general, for finding the 
right place where to put an extracted square, we will have had to fumble around by trials and errors; 
but, guided by the structure of the form-of-colour carried by the square, we will have finally identified 
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the 'good' place of the square. And the structure of the form-of-colour of the square will have been 
useful mainly by its content in the proximity of the borders of the square where, for each given border, 
it determines a sort of neighborhood-coherence with the form-of-colour reaching a unique other 
border of another square. A sort of attraction by semantic continuity acts between the two mentioned 
borders and, on the contrary, a sort of repulsion by semantic discontinuity works between the form-of-
colour that reaches the initially considered border of the considered square, and any other form-of-
colour reaching any border of any other square. This time the independent power of topological 
organization of the space coordinates will have been filtered out and replaced by these 'attractions via 
semantic continuity' or 'repulsions via semantic discontinuity'. And again nothing infinite will have 
been involved and nothing will have been random – if abstraction is made of the randomness in the 
order of extraction of the squares – notwithstanding the presence of trials and errors. For, quite 
obviously, the trials and errors are tied with features of the defined situation, of which the nature is 
radically different from that of a predictive uncertainty in the probabilistic sense.  
This example, like the preceding one, can be extended in an obvious way to the case of an 
'evolving picture' fragmented in space-time cubes of which the space-time labels are by-passed, while 
exclusively other descriptional contents are considered, with the attractions by continuity on the 
borders and the repulsions by discontinuity on the borders which these contents entail. (During the 
research of a criminal, for instance, in essence, one plays a generalized space-time puzzle game). 
IV.1.4. Puzzle with several replicas of the painting P 
Let us now provide ourselves with 1000 replicas of the fragmented painting P and let us proceed 
with these in the same way as we did above for one replica : we mix together all the 100 000 squares 
which we now possess, we shed them all into the pool-box, and then we extract the squares one by 
one, ignoring the space label and the approximate-colour label imprinted on it and searching for the 
square an appropriate place on one or other among the 1000 void space-time grids placed in front of 
us. What will happen? After 100 000 extractions from the ballot-box we certainly shall have entirely 
reconstructed all the 1000 replicas of the fragmented painting P. But this will have been achieved only 
after quite a lot of trials and errors and not by a neatly separate completion of the replicas, in 
succession, but by an intermingled process of completion of all the replicas, involving leaps from one 
replica to another one. In general, only by the last extractions will all the 1000 replicas have entirely 
separated from one another. 
In principle, no essentially new features are brought in by the use, instead of 1000 replicas, of 
10n replicas with n an arbitrary whole number. And this game also can obviously be extended to a set 
of 'evolving paintings'. And again nothing infinite will have been involved and – notwithstanding the 
presence of trials and errors – nothing will have been random if abstraction is made of the randomness 
in the order of extraction of the squares. 
A puzzle game, no matter how complex and big, involves randomness exclusively in the order 
of extraction of the squares.  
The attractions by semantic continuity on the borders of the squares and the repulsions by 
violation of semantic continuity on the borders, exclude randomness from the final 
reconstruction of any number of replicas of the global entity which has been parceled. 
IV.1.5. Probability game with one replica of the painting P 
How, then, does 'probabilistic randomness' emerge? By a modification which, at a first sight, 
will seem insignificant, suddenly all the characters of a 'probabilistic situation' will come in: unending 
sequences of elementary events, the corresponding statistical relative frequencies, probabilistic 
randomness and probabilistic convergence. The announced apparently insignificant modification will 
reveal itself to have been in fact a radical conceptual jump. 
We make use of the same parceled painting P involved in the preceding paragraphs. But this 
time, instead of a puzzle game, let us play, with just one replica of this puzzle, the following 
'probabilistic game'. Let us mix the squares and shed them into the ballot box. Then let us extract a 
square. Let us use exclusively the view Vac of uniform approximate colour, note the value of the index 
j that appears in the corresponding relative description Dj, j=1, 2….q, and then drop the examined 
square back into the ballot box (both the aspect Vφc of colour-form and the space frame-aspect V(El) 
 26 
of spatial location remain dumb, so a fortiori the semantic continuity on the borders of the square 
remain inactive). Let us then mix the squares from the ballot box and repeat the same procedure an 
arbitrarily big number of times. 
I assert that this time, in consequence of the specified modification of the procedure, we find 
ourselves in a standard 'probabilistic situation'. Indeed, contrary to what happened in all the preceding 
cases, this time, before each extraction, a certain set of invariant conditions is reconstituted, which 
defines – in the usual sense of probabilistic language – a 'reproducible procedure' Π and a stable 
universe of elementary events U≡{j}, j=1,2….q, so a random phenomenon (Π,U). Since according to 
MRC (point (9)) any communicable knowledge is description, let us rewrite explicitly the universe U 
as a universe of relative descriptions U≡{Dj}, j=1,2….q.  
What will happen in these new probabilistic conditions? Can that be predicted?   
If the number of successive extractions and droppings back into the ballot box is very much 
bigger than the number q of elements from U, one can make the two following rather obvious remarks 
R1 and R2. 
 R1. Since the whole initial content of the ballot box is reconstituted after each drawing, all the 
descriptional values j=1,2,….q that had been possible before some given extraction, are equally 
possible for the following one. From one extraction to another one, no possibility is irreversibly 
'consumed', as it happened in the cases considered in the preceding paragraphs. This entails stability of 
the global factual situation.  
R2. Correlatively, the content of the ballot box is never exhausted. Nothing brings any more to 
an end the sequence of results which can be obtained by repetition of extraction-dropping. This 
sequence is of arbitrary length, it can increase 'toward infinity'. This is the source of potential non 
effectiveness.  
I add now two other assertions which are not perceived as certainties.  
The first one is the answer A1 to the following question Q1: "If one continues indefinitely the 
repetitions of extraction-dropping, will all the q values of the index j of medium colour show up, or 
not ?"  
The second assertion A2 is the answer to the following question Q2: "If the repetitions of 
extraction-dropping are continued indefinitely, how will evolve the relative frequency n(j)/N of the 
outcomes of a given value j of the index of medium colour ?". 
I now assert a psychological fact: after a short reflection, the following answers A1and A2 to the 
questions Q1 and Q2 will gain quasi unanimous consensus among persons skilled in current 
probabilistic thinking. 
 A1. It is nearly certain that if the number N of repetitions of extracting-dropping becomes big 
enough, all the q values of the index j of medium colour will show up. 
  A2. If the number N of repetitions of extracting-dropping is increased without a priori 
limitation, then – earlier or later but nearly certainly and for any j – the relative frequency n(j)/N of the 
outcomes of a given value j of the index of uniform approximate-colour will manifest a certain 
convergence. Namely, the value of the relative frequency n(j)/N will tend to reproduce the value of the 
ratio nP(j)/100 which refers the number nP(j) of squares from the integrated puzzle of the painting P  
which carry the considered value j of approximate-colour, to the total number100 of all the squares 
from the puzzle of P. 
But why should there be a convergence? And quite especially, why precisely toward this ratio 
nP(j)/100 defined on P? And why, in both formulations A1 and A2, should one assert a 'nearly 
certainty' instead of, clearly, a certainty? Because, more or less explicitly, in the minds of those who 
adhere to the answers A1 and A2, some equivalent of the following reasoning takes place.  
"Since after every extraction and registering of the obtained j-value, the square is released back 
into the ballot box, and since the extractions are allowed to be repeated indefinitely, there exists no 
basis for strictly excluding a priori, concerning a sequence of arbitrarily big length N, the outcome of 
any one among the different possibilities {j≡1,2,…q} ; nor, moreover, the outcome of any order of 
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succession of j-values from {j=1,2,…q} ; nor the outcome of any one among all the global statistical 
distributions {n(j)/N, j=1,2,…q}, Σjn(j)/N=1, of relative frequencies n(j)/N that are constructible for a 
given N, with j-values belonging to the universe {Dj},  j≡1,2,…q of relative descriptions. In the 
conditions of indefinite repeatability that have been posited here, any outcome of any feature that 
cannot be a priori excluded on the basis of some specified reason, has to be a priori admitted as 
possible. These two formulations have the same significance, so any distinction between them would 
amount to a contradiction. For instance, nothing permits to strictly exclude a priori the maximally 
unbalanced statistical distribution which, for any given N and j', is characterized by n(j')/N=1, i.e. 
n(j')=N,  n(j)=0 for any j≠j' (with j'=2:  2222222222….. N times). Indeed if in the first extraction it has 
been possible to find a square carrying j=2, since that square has been released back in the ballot box 
before the second extraction, the same possibility holds also for the second extraction, and so on, 
indefinitely. But nothing excludes either to find j≠2. This entails the answer A1. 
However we know that the number of squares in the pool box and the number of possible 
approximate-colour values j are both finite and that any square comes from the puzzle of the integrated 
painting P. In these conditions, before each extraction it is natural to expect more to find on the 
extracted square a j-value of approximate-colour which, on the integrated painting P, is repeated, say, 
on 10 different squares, rather than to find the j-value of approximate-colour which on the integrated P 
is repeated, say, on only 2 different squares. What is effectively found after an extraction leaves 
invariant the reasonableness of the specified expectation before that extraction. We must avoid 
confusion between a priori and a posteriori as well as between 'possible' and 'probable'. So, since we 
know that before each extraction the pool box contains exclusively the 100 squares which compose the 
total number, let us denote it nPT=100, of puzzle-pieces from of one replica of the painting P, it is 
natural to expect a priori that in a sufficiently long sequence of j-results each possible j-value be 
obtained a number of times approximately proportional to the number of squares on which this j-value 
is realized on the integrated painting P; and to also expect that while the number N of accomplished 
extractions increases, the relative frequency n(j)/N be found to tend to converge, for each given j-
value, toward the ratio nP(j)/nPT=nP(j)/100 realized for that j-value on one integrated replica of the 
painting P. In the posited conditions, any different assumption would be devoid of support, while this 
one – in a certain sense – simply follows.  
Indeed the global form of one replica of P is contained in there, the pool box, even if it is 
parceled. So, in the long term, it must manifest itself via any view that is not entirely blind with respect 
to it. Now in the conditions of our probability game, the unique active view is the approximate-colour 
view Vac endowed with the possible values j≡1,2,…q. This view is not entirely blind with respect to 
the form of P. And in the conditions of our probabilistic game, the unique possible manifestation of 
the global colour-form aspect of P that is possible via the approximate-colour view Va, consists of a 
set of relative frequencies {n(j)/N}, j=1,2,…q which reproduces the set of ratios {nP(j)/nPT }, j=1,2,…q 
from the global colour-form aspect of P. So such a set of relative frequencies is what has to be 
expected, by default. This amounts to the asserted convergence. 
However this has to be expected nearly with certainty, not with certainty. This is entailed by the 
conditions which ourselves have posited: these conditions simply exclude the assertion that each 
relative frequency n(j)/N} will certainly converge toward the corresponding ratio {nP(j)/nPT= nP(j)/100, 
so all the more that it will strictly reproduce this ratio. 
Indeed it has already been pointed out that any sequence of N results j is possible, even a 
sequence kkkkkkkkk.....of N results j=k. But we are reasoning inside the abstract framework of the 
concept of probability25, so for the probabilities on a universe of events of any sort, there is a 
condition of norm : the sum of all the probabilities assigned to the events from the considered 
universe, whatever these be, must be equal to 1. Consider than a sequence σω(N,j) of N results j where 
‘ω’ is an index of statistical structure {n(j)/N}, j≡1,2,…q  and N is any whole number. For any give N 
there exists a corresponding finite set {σω(N,j)}, j≡1,2,…q, ω=1,2,……ν, of ν mutually distinct 
statistical structures constructible with N. These constitute a universe of events (meta-events, with 
respect to the events from {j}, j=1,2,…q). And the probabilities p(σω(N,j)), ω=1,2,……ν assigned to 
                                                 
25
 It is not circular to introduce such considerations: here only the concept of a FACTUAL probability law is acknowledged to be still 
undefined, but the abstract mathematical probabilistic syntax introduced by Kolmogorov is accepted, at least as an initial basis. 
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these new (meta)events are also subject to the condition Σω p(σω(N,j))=1. So any sequence σω(N,j), 
while on the one hand it is possible a priori, on the other hand it 'consumes' inside the condition Σω 
p(σω(N,j))=1 a certain 'quantity of probability'. This interdicts to assign a priori certainty (probability 
1) to any given sequence σω(N,j) : if one did this, thereby, contrary to the initial assumption of a priori 
possibility of any sequence, he would a priori exclude – for the considered N, but whatever it be – the 
possibility of all the sequences (σω(N,j) but only one among them. This would be a contradiction. So a 
certain and strict convergence toward all the ratios nP(j)/100, is excluded by the very rules of our 
probabilistic game. 
But nothing, in the rules of the probability game, does interdict the intuitive notion that with 
sufficiently large numbers N each relative frequency n(j)/N would – nearly certainly – come arbitrarily 
near to the corresponding ratio {nP(j)/nPT = nP(j)/100. This is precisely the answer A2 to the question 
Q2. 
So the quasi intuitive motivations which underlie the answers A1 and A2 to, respectively, the 
questions Q1 and Q2, are now explicit. These, of course, are not motivations exiting inside any mind. 
They are trained motivations generated by, precisely, a deep understanding of the theorem of large 
numbers. So let us compare their manifestation concerning the special case of the probability game 
with the puzzle of the painting P, with the general theorem of large numbers.  
IV.2. An effective factual probability law in the case of the 'probability game' with the painting P 
At a first sight, the motivation brought forth above for the answers to the questions Q1 and Q2, 
seems trivial. But in fact it discloses a conclusion which, itself, is far from being trivial. Indeed from 
A1 and A2 there finally emerges – for the particular case of a probability game with the picture P – an 
effective definition founded upon 'real facts', of the so elusive concept of a factual probability law. And 
it is by reference to the law of large numbers that this definition imposes itself. For when one writes 
∀j,  ∀(ε, δ),       ∃N0 :   ∀(N≥ N0)  ⇒   P [(n(ej)/N - p(ej)) ≤ ε ] ≥ (1 - δ)   (2) 
via a mere identification of terms one is led to clearly perceive that the expression (2) of the theorem 
of large numbers can be regarded as a rigorous mathematical translation of precisely the partially 
intuitive and partially 'reasoned' answers A1 and A2. Indeed let us set  
ej≡Dj,       {p(Dj)}≡{nP(j)/nPT}≡{nP(j)/100},   j=1,2…q,                                                   (3) 
This yields the form (2) where the numbers {nP(j)/100)},  j=1,2…q, satisfy all the conditions to be 
imposed upon a probability law (cf. the note 3), whether formal or factual (they are real positive 
numbers – here rational numbers – they obey the norm condition ΣjnP(j)/100)=1, etc.).  
So, in the case of the probability game with the picture P the set of ratios 
{nP(j)/nPT}≡{nP(j)/100)},  j=1,2…q defines on the set of events {Dj},  j≡1,2…q  a quite definite and 
effective factual probability law  
{pF(Dj)}≡ {nP(j)/nPT}≡ {nP (j)/100},   j=1,2,….q,         F: factual                                    (4) 
It is striking to notice that the definition (4) amounts to make use of the intuitive concept of the 
probability of an ‘outcome’ as [the number of 'favorable cases']/[the number of all the possible 
'cases']:  
The theorem of large numbers, established inside the mathematical theory of measures, implies 
this intuitive definition.   
But such as it is implied by the theorem of large numbers, this intuitive definition is non 
effective and absolute. In this sense, so such that it is involved in this theorem, it is banished by MRC. 
On the other hand the construction that led to the definition (4) has been drawn into evidence by the 
use of the descriptional relativities imposed by MRC. This remarkable agreement-and-dissention 
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between the theorem of large numbers and MRC might conceal a clue in the search of elucidation of 
the connection between factuality and syntax in the case of the concept of probability. 
So, in the particular case of the probability game with the puzzle of the painting P, the problem 
of the construction of a factual probability law constructed "on the basis of real physical facts", has 
found a solution: Starting from the integrated painting P, by a 'probabilization' involving a puzzle 
founded on P and a 'simplification' of the descriptions of the pieces of this puzzle by passage from the 
initial elements D/Gσ,σ(xk,yh),Vc∪Vφ∪V(E)/ of this puzzle, to the universe of events {Dj}≡{ j},  
j=1,2,….q, we have finally constructed a standard factual probability space in the sense of 
Kolmogorov 
[{Dj}, τX , {nP (j)/nPT}],     j=1,2,….q                                                                            (5)  
where τX  denotes any algebra on {Dj},  j≡1,2…q, while the factual probability law {nP(j)/nPT},  
j=1,2,….q is defined directly on the basic universe {Dj},  j≡1,2…q (which then determines also the 
factual probability law on τX , whatever its specification)26. 
This conclusion, together with the questions Q1, Q2 and the answers A1, A2 which led to it, 
involve a definite solution to the question, also, of the significance to be assigned – in this case – to the 
assertion of merely the existence of a factual probability law. Indeed in the answers A1 and A2, the 
belief in the existence of a factual probability law has been founded upon the fact that before each 
extraction of a square, a whole replica of the parceled painting P was contained in the pool box, and 
nothing else. So the significance of the 'existence' of a factual probability law is [the systematically 
iterated implicit presence of an integrated form throughout the operated probabilistic trials]. This 
significance remained hidden by the fact that, by the construction, by the rules of the game, the 
presence of this integrated form is constrained to manifest itself to our knowledge only progressively 
and in cryptic terms, namely via the evolving relative frequencies {n(j)/N}, j=1,2,…q of outcomes of 
this or that sign j, inside sequences of N such signs. (I make use of the word 'signs' because, by 
construction, j≡Dj and in Dj any trace of form-of-colour D/G,κ(xk,yh),Vc∪V(E)∪Vφc/,  k=1,2,…10,  
h=1,2…10, carried by a square, has been filtered out by the uniform 'values' of the approximate-colour 
aspect-view Vac, so that any hint of participation in a more integrated structure endowed with a global 
'significance' that would exceed that description Dj≡j, has become non perceptible, and so in (5) any 
Dj≡j acts only as a sign from a set of signs). Correlatively, in consequence of the relativizations 
imposed by MRC, the vague intuitive definition of the probability of an ‘outcome’ acquires a quite 
precise character and it is associated with the semantic notion of ‘integrated form’. Globally, the 
imprisonment in, exclusively, the probabilistic level of perception and conceptualization has been 
broken: awareness of an essential connection with another superposed level has been established. 
We summarize. In the considered case, the knowledge of the colour-form carried by the global 
painting P, together with the way of parceling P and the view defined on the fragments, determine in 
effective terms, both, the significance of the assertion of existence of a factual probability law acting 
on the universe of events {Dj},  j≡1,2…q, (namely knowledge of the presence inside the ballot box, at 
the time of each realization of the procedure ∏, of the whole (parceled) painting P) and the structure 
of this factual probability law, namely the set (4) of rational numbers. In this case we are in 
possession of a factual interpretation-and-model for the concept of an effective factual probability law.  
And by a conceptual feed-back, the interpretation-and-model obtained for this case acts as an 
intuitive 'justification' or ‘explanation’ of the theorem of large numbers. It makes this theorem 
immediately intelligible. It also brings into evidence the source, in this case, of the non effective 
character of the theorem, namely the impossibility to make use of the finiteness of the integrated 
whole (a form, in this case) that is involved in the concept of probability law {p(ei)} ≡ {pF(Dj)} ≡ 
                                                 
26
 We want to strongly stress that the contents of IV.1.5 and IV.2 are not asserted here as a proof, but as a construction. We are here outside 
any syntactic system. We are researching a factual definition of the concept of probability law. The theorem of large numbers has been used 
like a guiding element, nothing more. Our final, more general aim is precisely to clarify the relation between the syntactic elements and the 
factual elements which – together – organize the concept of probability. 
 30 
{nP(j)/100},  i= j, j=1,2,….q, from the theorem, simply because we do not know it and we even are 
unaware of it.  
Indeed as long as one does not dispose explicitly of knowledge of finite constraints that 
determine and assign significance to the factual probability law to be asserted, while also permitting a 
fragmentation in finite sequences of the total number N of repetitions of the involved experiment, there 
is no other recourse than to make use of  
(a) an indefinitely increasing integer N that counts uniformly, without any inner organization, 
the total number of achieved realizations of the involved experiment; and  
(b) of – directly – a non effective definition of the concept of probability, in terms of a 
mathematical limit that be able to offer conceptual room for any factual sequence of N rational 
numbers. 
Inside the theorem (2) of large numbers the assertion (b) of a mathematical limit for any relative 
frequency n(ej)/N requires real numbers in the formal general definition of a probability law. 
Correlatively it wholly skips the question of an independent and effective factual definition to be 
associated with the abstract existence of such a mathematical limit – supposing that it is genuinely 
useful. And furthermore it abandons inside the implicit the major fact that the formal definition, by 
itself, yields no indication whatsoever concerning the particular numerical distribution from the factual 
probability law to be associated with a particular factual probabilistic situation.  
IV.3. Generalization 
IV.3.1. Preliminaries  
The 'probabilistic game' with the puzzle of the painting P has brought forth perception of the 
possibility that any given factual probabilistic situation be somehow connectable with a corresponding 
'global form' that expresses the semantic content of the considered situation and which determines by 
mere counting and in terms of a finite set of rational numbers, the factual probability law to be 
asserted in that particular probabilistic situation. In what follows we investigate this possibility. 
The role of MRC throughout VI.1 and VI.2.  
To begin with, let us note that the new insight gained above is indelibly tied with MRC. The 
development from VI.1 and IV.2 would not have been possible in the absence of an explicit awareness 
of the fact that any communicable and consensual knowledge is description and without a systematic 
relativization of each one among the various sorts of description that have been considered, to a well 
defined corresponding epistemic referential (G,V), so to a definite triad (G,œG ,V). Indeed the 
preceding development stayed blocked a priori as long as a description D/G,œG ,V/ was simply 
identified with the object-entity œG involved in it, which furthermore was being denoted like in the set 
theory by just a written label 'ei' devoid of any semantic content specifically connected with the 
considered factual situation, as indeed it is inside Kolmogorov universes of elementary events: in such 
conditions no 'contours' of any sort would have been expressible, no 'local forms' nor 'global form', no 
'semantic' attractions to pass from the first ones to the second ones, nothing available to host and to 
guide a puzzle-like approach, nothing available for even only being able to conceive of it. Moreover, 
before having perceived that 'truth' also is a definite concept only when it is relativized, so before 
having acquired capacity to confront the problems of truth in a sense that becomes definite in 
consequence of relativizations, the danger to sink into paralyzing false problems of absolute 'truth' 
would have threatened the mind at each step.  
But now we have grown aware of the crucial role of explicit and exhaustive relativization. In 
particular, it has become clear that the concept of a factual probability law, since it is involved in 
relative descriptions like any communicable and consensual knowledge, is marked by non removable 
relativities. So now we know that: 
Speaking of 'the' probability law p(U) to be asserted on the universe U from a probability 
space, is a false absolute, a huge, and devastatingly false absolute.  
Therefore from now on, to avoid fuzziness and the consequences of fuzziness, we have to work 
on the basis of explicit general MRC-redefinitions. We reckon that these will clearly disclose new 
guiding lines – and possibly also categories of cases and limits – concerning the possibility to 
 31 
construct the unknown factual numerical probability distribution that can be asserted on a given 
universe of elementary events. 
MRC definitions and consequences 
Consider what is currently called 'a random phenomenon' accordingly to Kolmogorov's formal 
theory of probabilities (Π,U) (cf. II.1). We want to specify the corresponding factual and relativized 
MRC-concept.  
The MRC-definition of the procedure Π from a random phenomenon (Π,U) has been found in 
earlier works (MS [2002], [2006] pp. 193-202) to quite generally correspond – in factual terms – to a 
"big" number N of repetitions of the sequence of operations [G.V] corresponding to a given epistemic 
referential (G,V) (like in the special case of microstates). So for a factual procedure Π we write 
Π≡[G.V] where, for each realization of Π : 
 (a) G is a factual operation of generation which – by methodological posit – systematically re-
introduces one same corresponding entity-to-be-described œG ; 
(b) V is a factual, active, operational view which re-introduces some given global ‘experimental 
situation’ and creates deliberately the whole action that leads to a qualification of œG via aspect-values 
of the aspect-views Vg from V that are observable on the final effect of one complete sequence 
Π≡[G.V]. Often V involves a registering test-entity, for instance a dice27, which is an 'object' in the 
usual classical sense.  
By what precedes the MRC-redefinition of the repeatable procedure Π  is achieved. So we can 
proceed to establishing the MRC-redefinition of the universe U of elementary events produced by Π. 
In general the view V includes more than one aspect-view Vg. So 'one' realization of the 
sequence Π≡[G.V] in general involves values of several aspect-views. In the case of a microstate the 
aspect-views Vg from V in general are not all mutually compatible in the sense defined in III.3.2, so 
'one' full realization of Π≡[G.V] in general consists of a union of distinct and mutually incompatible 
sequences [G.Vg]. But here, in agreement with the classical theory of probabilities, we suppose that all 
the aspect-views from the acting view are mutually compatible so that all the effects of the realization 
of one sequence Π≡[G.V] are obtained simultaneously. So here [(a)+(b)] entails that each one 
realization of the sequence of epistemic operations Π≡[G.V] produces, for the entity œG generated by 
G, one given set of qualifications by aspect-values gk of the aspect-views Vg from V.  
Now, according to the central MRC-definition 5 from III.5 the assertion of any relative 
description requires repetitions of the corresponding sequence [G.V]. (Indeed for a fully regular 
relativized description it can be conceived a priori that when the procedure Π≡[G.V] is repeated N 
times, the same group of gk-values of the aspect-views Vg from V comes out N times; and if that 
happened we would be by definition in presence of an 'N-individual' description D/G,œG ,V/ (III.5 
point 5); in this sense even an 'N-individual' description involves N repetition' of Π≡[G.V] in order to 
be able to assert its N-individuality). But here, by hypothesis, we are not in presence of an 'individual' 
description, we are in presence of a case where it is assumed that the succession Π≡[G.V], when 
repeated a large number N of times, produces a whole universe U of mutually distinct 'elementary 
events'. So in MRC-terms, each one of these elementary events can only be regarded as a sort of limit 
of the canonical MRC-concept of an N-individual relativized description, namely the limiting case in 
which N=1. Nonetheless we are now already in presence of relativized description instead of a mere 
notation ei devoid of any specified semantic content, as it is the case in the classical theory of 
probabilities; and the probabilistic game with the puzzle of a picture has offered already an 
opportunity for realizing how precious new guidelines for reasoning and epistemic actions are offered 
by the fact that inside MRC what is called an elementary event reemerges as a relativized description. 
A limit-description of an elementary event Dr in the sense just specified above will be denoted 
Dr/G,œG ,V/ or, in short, Dr. Since inside MRC everything is finite, the universe U of all the possible 
descriptions Dr producible with the epistemic referential (G.V) is finite. So the MRC-redefinition of 
the universe U of elementary events produced by Π can be written as U≡{Dr}, r=1,2,…s, with s a 
finite integer and r a global unique index associated to the whole set of qualifications {gk}, ∀VgεV, 
produced by one realization of the procedure Π.  
                                                 
27
 In general more than only one test-entity can be involved, but for simplicity here we speak of only one such entity. 
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The preceding considerations entail the following two MRC-definitions. 
MRC-definition of a factual relativized random phenomenon. In MRC terms, a factually 
realizable and relativized random phenomenon (Π,U) has to be re-written as 
 (Π,U) ≡ { [G.V]n ,{Dr}, r=1,2,…s,  n=1,2,….N } ≡ D/G,œG ,V/ 
where: Π≡[G.V], with G an epistemic operation that introduces the entity-to-be-described œG ; 
V=∪Vg, g=1,2,…m,  with m an integer, is an operational view that exists with respect to œG ; U≡{Dr}, 
r=1,2,…s, with s a finite integer and r a global index associated to the whole set of qualifications 
produced by one realization of the procedure Π≡[G.V]; n – finite – labels the repetitions of the 
procedure Π≡[G.V] and 'the' relative description D/G,œG ,V/ which finally emerges (mind the singular) 
is a statistical description (III.5, point 5) and is presupposed to be endowed with some definite though 
conventionally chosen (N,N') stability (III.5, point 5). 
MRC-definition of a factual relativized probabilistic situation. Consider a random phenomenon 
(Π,U) ≡ {[G.V]n,{Dr}, r=1,2,…s, n=1,2,….N} ≡ D/G,œG ,V/. The experimental circumstances supposed 
by this concept – namely the 'identical' repeatability of the procedure Π – seem to justify the 
presupposition that – in a factual sense that can be shown to be in agreement with the formal non 
effective theorem of large numbers – the statistical relativized description D/G,œG ,V/ will necessarily 
manifest a degree of (N,N')-stability that permits to posit a 'probabilistic convergence' of the relative 
frequencies n(Dr)/N where DrεU, r=1,2…s, when (N,N') are increased. This amounts to just posit that 
in the considered circumstances a factual numerical probability distribution {pF(Dr)}, r=1,2…s on the 
universe U≡{Dr}, r=1,2,…s can be identified. So we shall say that a relativized factual random 
phenomenon is presupposed to create a corresponding relativized factual probabilistic situation. 
Consequences 
Let us now explicate the consequences of the two preceding definitions and the questions raised 
by these.  
(a) Descriptional aims and corresponding descriptional roles. The preceding definitions bring 
into evidence the feature of freely chosen descriptional aims and of corresponding descriptional roles. 
This feature is crucially important throughout MRC. In the following point (b) it will lead us to a 
surprising conclusion. 
In microphysics, quasi systematically, the operation of generation G acts inside a basic 
epistemic referential and it is radically creative, while the corresponding entity-to-be-described is not 
directly observable. But in classical probabilistic situations the operation of generation G is – in 
general – just an operation of selection, a selector which, each time that it is realized, re-introduces an 
entity-to-be-described that is directly observable and even can, in particular, consist of an already 
preexisting ‘object’ in the usual sense.  
For instance, consider a dice-random phenomenon and let us imagine successively two different 
cases. 
 (a1) The dice is suspected to be loaded and the descriptional aim is to know whether yes or not 
this suspicion is founded. This aim suggests to form an epistemic referential (G,V) where G consists of 
selecting the 'object' consisting of the dice and assigning it the descriptional role of the entity-to-be-
described, while the table on which the dice is thrown is regarded as a registering device incorporated 
to the qualifying view V from (G,V). These choices entail that the table is supposed to be a known 
datum that has been previously worked out correspondingly to the descriptional role assigned to it (its 
horizontality, planarity, etc., have been insured). In this case one elementary event consists of just the 
number readable on the upper face of the dice when it has settled on the table after having been thrown 
on it. But the researched description of the dice is not exhausted by the individual reading of the result 
of only one throw of the dice, it is a statistical description. The observation of a quasi uniformity of the 
whole obtained statistical distribution will be coded by saying « the dice is not loaded », while non 
uniformity of this distribution will be coded by saying « the dice is loaded »: in this case the factual 
probability law on the universe of elementary events is not known and furthermore its exact form is 
not even researched. It simply is exterior to the chosen descriptional aim.  
 33 
(a2) But nothing hinders to choose another descriptional aim, namely to construct a fair dice-
game. This might induce the choice of an epistemic referential (G,V) where G is a selector which now 
selects the table to be put in the role of the entity-to-be-described (in order to check its degree of 
horizontality and of smoothness) while this time the dice is assigned the role of a registering device 
incorporated to the acting view. So this time the geometry and structure of the dice have been 
deliberately constructed before such as not to favor by its inner structure any one among the six 
possible outcomes 1, 2…6. But we do not know whether the table also is adequate, so for this we have 
to check. In these new conditions an elementary event consists of the place on the table where the dice 
settles after a throw. And the researched description of this place is statistical again: uniformity of the 
obtained statistical distribution of the settled locations of the dice on the table will mean « the table is 
plane and smooth » while non-uniformity will mean « the table has defaults of smoothness or/and 
planarity ». In this case the factual probability distribution on the universe of elementary events is 
neither known, nor unknown: according to the chosen descriptional aim this law has to be constructed 
such as to be uniformly distributed. (Obviously the roles of the dice and the table can be reversed, the 
aim of constructing a fair dice-game being kept invariant). 
The considerations from (a1) and (a2) suffice for illustrating in what a sense according to MRC 
‘operation of generation’, ‘object-entity-to-be-studied’, ‘view’, 'elementary event', 'description', are not 
features tied with some support, but only descriptional roles corresponding to the choice of an 
epistemic referential (cf. III, point 7).  
This sort of independence of any fixed support – whether material or conceptual – that 
characterizes the MRC descriptional roles "G", "œG", "V", founds the flexibility of MRC, the 
possibility to apply it for any descriptional aim (MMS [2006] pp. 97-105). It can be regarded as a sort 
of methodological 'principle of relativity' that insures an invariant general procedure for describing in 
MRC-terms whatever is describable and one wants to describe. 
 (b) The concept of random phenomenon as a methodological artefact. The MRC-definition of 
a factual and relativized random phenomenon with the corresponding 'probabilistic situation', together 
wit the comments from (a) bring into evidence a fact that might come as a surprise, though as soon as 
it has been formulated it appears as obvious:  
A formal 'random phenomenon' is not a concept that designates a naturally existing structure. It 
is a general conceptual-factual artefact. And each specified factual random phenomenon – in 
particular, as defined inside MRC – is a conceptual-factual artefact deliberately constructed with a 
corresponding aim; namely precisely the creation of a corresponding 'probabilistic' factual situation, 
that is, a situation endowed with 'probabilistic predictability', so involving a definite factual numerical 
distribution of probabilities coherent with the general formal concept of a probability law.  
One might be tempted to resist this assertion. One might want to think that factual random 
phenomena with their respective factual probabilistic situations can also occur naturally. This doubt, 
however, is doomed to fade away. One realizes soon that a full and rigorous materialization of the 
concept of random phenomenon cannot be conceived as a natural circumstance. Natural conditions can 
only yield a basis for organizing a random phenomenon out of naturally statistical impacts upon the 
human biological registering apparatuses, with their artificial prolongations.  
Consider for instance the case of meteorological predictions. The earth with its water volumes-
and-surfaces, its relief, vegetation, fauna, and its atmosphere, constitute a finite and practically closed 
whole which nowadays has become perceptible as such by the help of global descriptions realized 
from satellites. Let us consider a relativized description D(t1) of this whole achieved at a time t1. The 
view from D(t1) is a 'meteorological view' including the aspect views of "pressure", "temperature", 
"humidity", "local velocity of displacement", etc., as well the space time frame-aspects E and T (the 
value t1 of T being fixed). The Navier-Stokes equations permit to transpose D(t1) into a set of other 
descriptions D(t2), D(t3)… D(tq)... corresponding to a set of other time-values t1>t2>t3.…>tq,…, the 
utilized view remaining fixed. If these time-values are all sufficiently close to t1 the transpositions are 
endowed with a remarkable degree of certainty. But when the time interval tq-t1 is increased this 
degree of certainty decreases and one is pushed toward probabilistic predictions.  
Now, a human being does never directly perceive a global description from the set D(t1), D(t2), 
D(t3)… D(tq).... At any given time tq he can only encompass a spatially local perception of the 
 34 
corresponding global description D(tq). Though in this case D(tq) itself is not parceled like in the case 
of the picture P, the description D(tq) can be treated as an equivalent of the global description of P 
from IV.1. Indeed,  suppose that on the basis of the knowledge of only D(t1) we want to make a 
prediction concerning the various local perceptions accessible to a human being at a time tq, the unit of 
time being, say, one day. Then tq is relatively distant from t1 and in the present state of our 
meteorological knowledge the prediction cannot be certain. But a probabilistic prediction can be 
researched. In particular it can be researched via a "probabilization" of D(tq). The global description 
D(tq) (just like that of the picture P) can be divided in nD fragments (for instance it can be realized 
such that each fragment covers an area equal to that of town of medium extension). Each one of these 
fragments emerges as a relative description Dr(tq) achieved with respect to the same aspect-views as 
D(t1) but which is local with respect to the frame-aspect E of space, r being a unique notation for the 
whole group of values of the aspect-views from the meteorological view from D(t1) that is realized on 
the considered local description. In these conditions one can work with the descriptions D(tq) and 
Dr(tq), r=1,2…s in a way entirely similar to that from our example of the puzzle of the painting P.  
So one might think that in this case, via the procedure from VI.1, it is possible to identify the 
probability distribution on the local descriptions Dr(tq), r=1,2…s by working with the naturally 
preexisting initial situation denoted D(t1) and with the subsequent natural statistical local 
manifestations denoted Dr(tq), r=1,2…s. But obviously the jump to such a conclusion cannot be 
accepted. For the treatment outlined above involves quite essentially relativized descriptions (among 
which the Navier-Stokes equation which also is description) and descriptions are not natural facts, 
they have to be deliberately realized and to be manipulated in a way such as to permit to make 
probabilistic predictions on weather. 
So we reassert that the general MRC concept of a factual random phenomenon is always an 
artefact: it is a methodological artefact conceived for capturing a sample from the ocean of natural 
randomness where we are immersed and for subjecting this sample to local constraints which – in 
specific relation with this or that particular aim – do insure the more or less feeble – but not null – 
degree of predictability, endowed with a peculiar sort of stability, which is called probabilistic 
predictability.  
This conclusion is a guide, in various ways. It brings into evidence dimensions of liberty for 
deliberate conceptual-factual constructions which can be fully exploited if – and only if – they are 
clearly known as such; whereas if they get mixed with obscure tendencies to 'discover' some 
'independently preexisting factual truth' they can only produce indefinite stagnation and even 
misleading assertions and procedures.  
 For instance, let (Π,U) be a factual random phenomenon involved by a "fair" game of chance. It 
is deliberately constructed as such under specific constraints. Among these let us note the fact that in 
this case the randomness is deliberately included in the procedure Π, in a way which (in general at 
least) insures – for the own features of randomness – a 'normal' Gaussian statistical distributions, 
without thereby altering the distribution imposed upon the factual probabilities on the elementary 
outcomes. This draws attention upon a frequent confusion between: 
- The distribution of numerical probabilities assigned to (or constructed for) the random features 
of the modalities of performing the experiment Π.  
- The distribution of numerical probabilities to be asserted on the universe U of the events 
produced by the repetitions of the experiment Π. 
This sort of confusion might explain the unreasonable profusion of Gaussian distributions 
asserted on the universe U of the events produced by the repetitions of the experiment Π  (It is Jean-
Marie Fessler [2008] who, in a private exchange, has strongly drawn my attention upon this 
unreasonable and certainly false profusion of Gaussian distributions asserted on universes U to be 
studied).    
(d) On the 'significance' of the 'existence' of a factual probability distribution. But what sort 
of significance, exactly, can be assigned to the mere 'existence' of the factual probability law entailed 
by a given probabilistic situation, abstraction being made of its form? 
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Karl Popper's well known 'propensity interpretation' (MS [1992B], [2002], [2006]) offers a first 
rather strong indication: 
"Take for example an ordinary symmetrical pin board, so constructed that if we let a number of little balls 
roll down, they will (ideally) form a normal distribution curve. This curve will represent the probability 
distribution for each single experiment, with each single ball, of reaching a possible resting place. Now let 
us "kick" this board; say, by slightly lifting its left side. Then we also kick the propensity, and the 
probability distribution,... Or let us, instead, remove one pin.  This will alter the probability for every 
single experiment with every single ball, whether or not the ball actually comes near the place from which 
we removed the pin.  .....we may ask: "How can the ball 'know' that a pin has been removed if it never 
comes near the place?" The answer is:  the ball does not "know"; but the board as a whole "knows", and 
changes the probability distribution, or the propensity, for every ball; a fact that can be tested by statistical 
tests". 
According to this interpretation the global experimental situation introduced by the procedure Π from 
any given random phenomenon, with all the material objects and all the actions involved by it, 
determines the specifically corresponding numerical law of distribution of the probabilities of the 
involved elementary events.  
We admit this interpretation as fully general. But in what follows we shall try to bring into 
evidence the whole structure of its foundation; and then, on this basis, to construct a general effective 
procedure for specifying the factual numerical distribution of probabilities involved by a probabilistic 
situation, in coherence with the formal theorem of large numbers. Finally, we shall submit to 
discussion the question of the limits of this effective procedure, so the question of the limits to be 
assigned to the constructability of a 'probabilistic situation' in the full sense of this expression. 
IV.3.2. Probabilization of any given entity perceived or conceived as a whole 
We begin with the easiest part, namely the generalization of the procedure which in IV.1 led 
from the picture P to a corresponding probability game. 
According to MRC «…only descriptions are unrestrictedly communicable knowledge, not 'facts' 
which are exterior to any psyche, nor psychic facts (emotions, desires, etc.) which are not expressed by 
some more or less communicational structure, verbal or of some other constitution. When we say « I 
know this house » we spell out an illusion, mainly because of unawareness but also for the sake of 
brevity. Indeed only the assertion « I know the descriptions (plural) of this house » would correctly 
express the situation toward which we wanted to point (III.5, MRC, point (11)). Furthermore, any 
relative description D/G,œG ,V/ consists of a cloudy structure or 'form' of points from the m-
dimensional representation-space of the view V from D/G,œG ,V/, points representing (gk)-values with 
g=1,2...m and  k=1,2,...w(g). If in particular the entity-to-be-described œG  is of a physical nature one 
must add to V a space-time view V(ET) (III.5, point 6). Obviously any such global whole or 'form' of 
points, if it is introduced as the primary datum, can be subject to various modalities of fragmentation, 
so to various relativized 'probabilizations', each one realized in ways quite similar in essence to that 
performed in IV.1. So the procedure of probabilization can be generalization to any relative 
description D/G,œG ,V/ that is introduced as a primary datum.  
This possibility, though in many circumstances it is of no use, might play a quite important role 
in certain domains (like medicine (systematic relativization of the scanning procedures and other 
modalities of analytic investigation, military explorations, explorations conducted from satellites or 
spatial devices or by robots, etc). 
IV.3.3. Toward a general procedure for constructing factual probability distributions 
Conversely now, we start with the relativized MRC-description of a factual probabilistic 
situation generated by a given random phenomenon and from the data offered by this description we 
shall try to specify the corresponding factual numerical distribution of probabilities via an effective 
procedure similar to that from IV.1 and IV.2. With respect to this new descriptional aim the path to 
follow is much less obvious. So we develop a very progressive approach. 
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Distillation of the essential points 
Relatively 'simplified' and relatively 'complexified'. Let us once more go back to the 
example of the probability game with the puzzle of the painting P. The aim is to bring into 
evidence which features of the approach practiced in that particular case are essential for a 
generalization and which ones can be dropped.  
The universe of label-elementary-event-descriptions U≡Dj, j=1,2,….q from that 
example consisted of a set of q mutually distinct sorts of pieces of puzzle – with q≪100 – 
that had been extracted (in certain specified conditions) from the set of 100 'local' relative 
descriptions D/Gσ,σ,V(El)∪Vcφ/ constituting the pieces of the puzzle of P. These 'local' 
descriptions D/Gσ,σ,V(El)∪Vcφ/ were maximally individualized with respect to the 
descriptional potentialities of the epistemic referential (Gσ ,V(El)∪Vcφ) where they had been 
constructed. Whereas the set of descriptions {Dj}, j=1,2….q had been obtained by re-
qualifying each one of all these 'local', maximally individualized relative descriptions 
D/Gσ,σ,V(El)∪Vcφ/, by the use of a simplifying view Vac of uniform approximate-colour. 
This, because any MRC-view is by definition a filter (III.5, point 4), has reduced the 
perception of each local relative description D/Gσ,σ,V(El)∪Vcφ/, to only a unique 
approximate-colour value j uniformly spread over it. So when, instead of making use of the 
'complete' view V(El)∪Vcφ acting inside the referential (Gσ ,V(El)∪Vcφ), we decided to make 
use for looking at a local description D/Gσ,σ,V(El)∪Vcφ/, of only the simplifying view Vac, 
we were led to just re-write this 'local' description as a simplified 'label-description' 
D/Gσ,σ,Vac/≡Dj.  
On the new simplified universe U≡{D/Gσ,σ,Vac/}≡{Dj}, j=1,2,….q where we had q≪100, any 
connection with the integrated relative description D/GP,,P, V(El)∪Vcφ / of the whole painting P 
had been effaced, it had been replaced by a cut from this integrated description of P.  
Correlatively inside any probability space [{Dj},τX ,{p(Dj)}], j=1,2,….q constructed on U≡{Dj} 
the factual numerical probability distribution {pF(Dj)}, j=1,2,….q to be inserted into the abstract 
measure {p(Dj)}, j=1,2,….q, was unknown. But in that particular case, the theorem of large numbers 
associated with the knowledge of the integrated puzzle of the painting P, led to the assertion of the 
researched numerical factual probability distribution {pF(Dj)}≡{nP(j)/nPT}≡{nP(j)/100},  j=1,2,….q. 
This happened in consequence of the very particular circumstance that each label-elementary-event-
description Dj had remained materially immersed in an already available and previously perceived 
more complex 'local' relativized description D/Gσ, σ, V(El)∪Vcφ/ (the operation of generation Gσ 
remained unchanged) that was itself a material fragment of the integrated description 
D/GP,P,V(El)∪Vcφ/ of the whole painting P. This compensated for the cut mentioned above, in the 
following way: it permitted to refer the 'simplified' descriptions from U≡{Dj} to the more complex 
local relativized descriptions D/Gσ,σ,V(El)∪Vcφ/ from the integrated puzzle of P and to then to count 
the occurrences of each Dj in a description D/Gσ ,σ,V(El)∪Vcφ/ from the puzzle of P. And this in its 
turn permitted to specify the factual probability distribution {pF(Dj)}≡{nP(j)/nPT}≡{nP(j)/100}, 
j=1,2,….q by comparison with the theorem of large numbers.  
But it seems certain that so propitious conditions do not realize in general. So, could one 
compensate in general for the absence of perceivable connections with a possibly still not materially 
constituted global form permitting to determine in an effective way the researched factual numerical 
distribution of probabilities? What, exactly, in the case of the puzzle of P, did these connections entail, 
which was so essential for revealing the researched factual distribution of probabilities, and what can 
be dropped? 
Let us first focus our attention upon the set {Dj}, j=1,2,….q, of 'label-descriptions', with q≪100. 
This amounts to starting this time with a random phenomenon that produces directly the universe 
U≡{Dj}, j=1,2,….q). With respect to this set {Dj}, j=1,2,….q, the set of 100 ‘local’ descriptions 
D/Gσ,σ,V(El)∪Vcφ/ worked out inside the referential (Gσ ,V(El)∪Vcφ) is a ‘complexified’ set; a set 
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which is richer by both the semantic content assigned to each element and by the number of elements. 
From a probabilistic point of view, this richer set of  the descriptions D/Gσ,σ,V(El)∪Vcφ/ can be 
regarded as a ‘universe’ Uc of 100 complexified ‘elementary events’ on which one can construct the 
complexified factual probability space [Uc,τcT , pF(τcT)] where the algebra is chosen to be the total 
algebra on Uc so that we have Uc⊂τ cT and pF(τcT ) is the factual numerical distribution of probabilities 
directly defined on τcT (as it is required by the abstract concept of a probability space) but which 
contains also the probability measure on Uc. Now, the complexified probability space [Uc,τcT,pF(τcT)]  
possesses a feature which in the present context is important: 
Any description Dj∊U which inside the factual probability space [U≡{Dj},τX, p(τX)],  j=1,2,….q 
constructed on U was an elementary-event-description, reappears insideτcT as an event-
description that is 'realized' by a whole set of complexified elementary-event-descriptions 
D/Gσ,σ,V(El)∪Vcφ/ from the universe Uc. 
MRC brings into strong evidence the well known but little stressed relativity of the elementary 
character of an event, in the probabilistic sense: elementary character, or not, of a probabilistic event is 
only a matter of reference. This entails a consequence. Inside the probability space [Uc,τcT ,p(τcT))] 
which, with respect to the initially considered space [U≡{Dj},τ, p(τ)],  j=1,2,….q  is 'complexified', 
one can count the number of complexified elementary-event-descriptions D/Gσ,σ,V(El)∪Vcφ/ from Uc 
that realize a given considered description Dj from the complexified total algebra τcT  constructed on 
Uc (which are ‘favourable’ to the outcome described by Dj because inside [{Uc,τcT ,p(τcT))] an outcome 
Dj is less constraint than an outcome D/Gσ, σ, V(El)∪Vcφ/). It was on the basis of this fact that, inside 
the integrated puzzle of the picture P which represents precisely the 'complexified' universe Uc, we 
have been able to identify the ratios {nP(j)/nPT}, j=1,2,…q (which then have determined the effective 
numerical factual distribution of probabilities {pF(Dj)}≡ {nP(j)/nPT}≡ {nP (j)/100},  j=1,2,….q,  (F: 
factual) from (4) by mere identification of terms with the equation (2) expressing the theorem of large 
numbers).               
The generation of a reference-background Uc endowed with a structure specified with more 
detail than that of the initially considered descriptions Dj from U themselves, permitted 
specifications concerning the descriptions Dj which in the absence of such a reference-
background were not possible.  
Let us now note that we would have obtained the same result inside the classical theory of 
probabilities – without making use of the integrated puzzle of P – if we had directly posited that inside 
the more complex space [{Uc,τcT ,p(τcT))] the probability of an event Dj from τcT  was proportional to 
the number of mutually distinct complexified elementary event D/Gσ,σ,V(El)∪Vcφ/ from Uc that 
realized Dj. But this posit would have been equivalent to postulating that the distribution of 
probabilities on the universe Uc was uniform. Indeed this postulation would have entailed precisely the 
numerical factual distribution of probabilities from (4), namely – on the basis of the general formal 
requirement p(A∪B)≤p(A)+p(B) where equality obtains iff A and B are mutually 'independent' (cf. 
note 3): 
This postulation would have rendered superfluous the possibility to act with the fragmentary 
local descriptions D/Gσ,σ,V(El)∪Vcφ/ from Uc as in a puzzle game, so also the existence of 
'semantic continuities' on the borders of these.   
But why should we postulate a uniform factual distribution of probabilities on the universe Uc?  
 [a priori - a posteriori] oscillations in classical probabilities. Inside the domain of the classical 
factual probabilistic conceptualization, Laplace has introduced his well known principle which 
requires the a priori assignation of a uniform distribution of probabilities on the universe U of 
elementary events from any space [U,τX, p(τX)]. This a priori assignation, however, is in Laplace's 
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thinking just an initial bet. This bet is expected to be in general invalidated by a posteriori 
measurements of the relative frequencies of the considered elementary outcomes from U; and when 
this happens indeed, and often it does, it requires a re-definition of the universe U of elementary 
events itself as well as a new bet of uniformity concerning the probabilities on this modified universe, 
and then a new confrontation with factuality, and so on and on. The number of necessary such pairs [a 
priori assumption – a posteriori confrontation] is not predictable. Sometimes this sort of [a priori-a 
posteriori] confrontation is repeated until the initially found dissention is effaced. But often an 
a priori posited uniform law simply is accepted in a definitive way, unquestioned and in 
absence of any a posteriori control28 (like in Boltzmann's statistical theory of gases and 
presumably in many quantum mechanical investigations where symmetries are invoked). The 
process might even never find an end. The procedure is practiced in an arty-crafty way.  
The abstract theory of probabilities has left place for the principle of Laplace. Indeed the fact 
that in an abstract probability space [U,τX ,p(τX)] the abstract probability law p(τX) is defined directly 
on the algebra of events τX,  not on the universe of elementary events U (cf. II.1), indicates that the 
distribution of probabilities on U is considered to be always decided a priori. (This also explains the 
fact noticed in VI.2 that the theorem of large numbers is compatible with the intuitive definition of the 
probability of an ‘outcome’ as [the number of 'favorable cases']/[the number of all the possible 'cases'] 
which amounts to assuming not only p(A∪B)≤p(A)+p(B)) but also a uniform distribution on U.  
So the problem of the identification of a true factual numerical distribution of probabilities on U 
is left open by the principle of Laplace. (Similar assertions hold concerning the well known principle 
of Jaynes). 
 [A priori - a posteriori] oscillations inside MRC. In the present approach however we have 
placed ourselves inside MRC, not inside the classical theory of probabilities. Does this not change the 
conceptual situation? Well, no, not with respect to the necessity to assume uniformity of the numerical 
probability distribution on a universe of elementary events: According to MRC the principle of 
Laplace is a deductive consequence of the principle of separation PS29, and this last principle plays a 
quite crucial role throughout MRC.  
                                                 
28
 When this is done the 'predictions' drawn from the calculi are in fact only 'best bets'. And very often this is the case indeed, for even if  
the involved  'constraints' (in particular the 'limiting conditions') are taken into account and so the principle of Jaynes is invoked instead of 
the principle of Laplace, still what is accepted is a best a priori bet that remains open to a posteriori invalidation. 
29
 Inside MRC – quite remarkably – the principle of Laplace follows deductively from the principle of separation  PS:  
Proposition. Consider a random phenomenon  (Π,,U), U≡{Dr}, r=1,2,….s worked out inside an epistemic referential (G,V) where 
the view V contains all the aspect-views that are directly observable on the outcomes of(Π,U) and the descriptions Dr are maximally worked 
out with respect to V. Consider also the probability space [U≡{Dr},τT(U), p(τT)] founded on (Π,U) where τX(U) is the total algebra on U, so it 
contains also all the elementary events from U. Consider now the factual numerical probability distribution p(U) which, by construction, is 
contained in p(τT). In the above conditions – a priori – p(U) can only be the uniform distribution  p(U)≡{p(Dr)}≡{1/s}, s times}, where s 
denotes the cardinal of the index-set r=1,2,….s. 
 Proof. By hypothesis the descriptions Dr from the universe U≡{Dr}, r=1,2,….s are maximally qualified with respect to the view V 
from the involved epistemic referential (G,V). So once the relative descriptions Dr have all been fully worked out, all the qualifying powers 
of (G,V) have been exhausted. Suppose now that one wants to furthermore meta-qualify these already achieved descriptions by global 
numerical qualifications, namely in the statistical terms of the relative frequencies of outcomes of the elementary-event-descriptions Dr from 
U, and then furthermore in also meta-meta probabilistic terms of convergence of these relative frequencies. Then one has to construct 
successively two new epistemic referentials, namely: first (G',V') where G'≠G introduces as [object-entity-of-description œG''] the whole 
previously achieved description of U≡{Dr} considered globally and V''≠V is now a purely 'counting' statistical view that specifies values 
n(Dr)/N of the aspect g≡'relative frequency' (with N the total number essays) but leaves unchanged the semantic contents of the descriptions 
Dr from U achieved inside (G,V); and then a referential (G'',V '') where G'' introduces as [object-entity-of-description œG'''] the whole 
previously achieved descriptions of relative frequencies while the view V '' qualifies the convergence of these but leaves unchanged the 
semantic contents of the descriptions previously achieved inside (G,V) and (G',V'). 
Now, according to the principle of separation PS, each one of these new desired descriptions has to be carried out inside its own 
epistemic referential in a way strictly SEPARATED from the descriptional processes from the other referentials).  
In these conditions, the a priori assertion of a factual probability law {p(Dr)}, r=1,2,….s on U≡{Dr}, r=1,2,….s that would not be 
uniformly distributed, could only stem from : 
(a) suppression – in the view V from (G,V) – of one or more aspect-views Vg or of one or more values gk of aspect-view ;  
(b) addition – in the view V from (G,V) – of one or more aspect-views Vg or of one or more values gk of aspect-view.  
But both (a) or (b) would amount to a surreptitious retroactive modification introduced in the epistemic referential (G,V) on the basis of 
some incentive induced by some other description from another referential. This would violate the principle of separation PS.  
So the principle of separation entails with necessity the a priori assertion of a uniformly distributed factual probability law 
p(U)≡{p(Dr)}≡{1/s, s times}, thereby insuring that the amount of data available inside the initial epistemic referential (G,V), is not arbitrarily 
transgressed. ∎ 
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Now, given that the principle of separation involves subjective epistemological-methodological 
features, the MRC-requirement of uniformity of the probability distribution posited on a universe of 
elementary events cannot be hoped to certainly entail a posteriori confirmation of its factual truth. 
This entails that the a posteriori factual truth of the distribution of probabilities on the events from the 
algebra of eventsτX constructed on U is equally left open. In short, inside MRC also, as long as we rely 
on the methodologically required a priori assumptions of uniform distributions of numerical 
probabilities, we do not get rid of possibly indefinite oscillations. But this sort of oscillations are a 
form of non-effectiveness, precisely what we want to eliminate.     
Consequence. The above considerations entail that in order to identify in an effective way the 
factually true numerical distribution of probabilities on the universe of events introduced by a given 
factual random phenomenon we must circumvent any insertion of a priori assumptions: only a purely 
factual and finite sequence of operations could realize this aim. 
Now, in the case of the puzzle of the picture P effectiveness was entailed by the possibility of 
counting elementary events and events inside any replica of the finite, closed whole 'P'. The semantic 
attractions on the borders of the 'complex' and 'local' descriptions D/Gσ,σ,V(El)∪Vcφ/ have been 
useful for that only in so far that:  
- They have permitted to build the finite closed whole 'P' ; 
- They have permitted to know when a replica of this whole had been completed, thus breaking 
retroactively the non interrupted flux of the increasing number N of registered 'outcomes' involved by 
the theorem of large numbers, into a sequence of replicas of the integrated puzzle of P; these were 
emerging in a mixed way, but separately from one another, and each one of the replicas – as soon as it 
had been completed – sufficed for estimating inside it the numbers which determined the researched 
probability distribution. 
Any substitute to a puzzle game which would introduce the two features explicated above, would 
bring solution to Kolmogorov's aporia: The requirement of possibility of a fully regular puzzle game, 
can be dropped in favor of such a minimal substitute, necessary and sufficient for our aim. This is a 
liberating conclusion. 
On ‘syntax’ in the usual sense, factuality, and MRC. We add now the following general 
remarks. We have already much stressed that inside the mathematical theory of probabilities – a purely 
syntactic system – the concept of a probability law is defined only by its general features. No 
statement is made concerning what probability has to be assigned to this or that elementary event or 
event from a given factual probability space. The formal definition remains void of numerical 
specifications. This is only a particular manifestation of a quite general and much too neglected 
characteristic of any formal syntax, mathematical or only logical, that is made use of in order to 
represent rigorously a domain of facts: The factual data to be introduced into the syntactic framework 
offered by such a purely formal system, always have to be entirely obtained inside the considered 
domain of facts. 
Nevertheless there persists a widespread and strong tendency to want to derive factual data 
inside a mathematical syntax. When such a tendency is yielded to, it generates paradoxes and false 
problems, so stagnation. MRC expressly eradicates by construction the possibility of realization of 
such erratic tendencies, at various crucial levels (III.5 points 5 and 10). This eradication imposes 
conditions of possibility: Inside any formal representation it requires 'hosting places' offered for 
introducing in them the necessary specifications which determine this or that factual application.  
Consider now the case of Kolmogorov's classical formal representation of the concept of 
probability. In this representation the void formal 'hosting places' offered for introducing in them the  
factual elementary events or events, are far from being endowed with a structure sufficiently definite 
and detailed for permitting to satisfy the MRC-requirements. Indeed since any knowledge that is 
communicable without restriction, is description, an elementary event or an event has to be specified 
as a description, namely a relativized description (cf.III.5, point 12). But a relativized description is 
referred to a triad (G,œG ,V) and any one aspect-view Vg from the involved view V introduces two 
indexes (formal places), one for the involved semantic dimension g and a second one for each 
                                                                                                                                                        
So MRC brings into evidence the methodological source of the principle of Laplace. 
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corresponding value index (gk). So, obviously, the bare notations ei and e simply cannot be utilized 
without savagely amputating the communicable expression of the involved descriptions. These – 
which have to be generated in a purely factual way – do not find a pre-organized formal recipient 
where to be inserted. This withstands the full realization of applications of the classical theory of 
probabilities. The example with the puzzle of the picture P indicates how MRC fills in this gap.  
IV.3.4. The algorithm of semantic integration of the factual distribution of probabilities in a given 
probabilistic situation 
The above preliminary considerations have distilled the essential features on which it can be 
tried to found a general procedure for estimating factual probabilities. With these features in mind we 
want to construct now a general for identifying the numerical probability distribution to be asserted on 
a factual probabilistic situation. We require this procedure to contain nothing else than directly a large 
number of factual repetitions of the procedure random phenomenon (Π,U), U≡{Dr}, r=1,2,….s: No a 
priori assumptions nor any sort of [a priori-a posteriori] dialogue; from the start and up to the end only 
registration of factual data endowed by construction with features permitting to finally perform the 
researched identification exclusively by finite conting of factually registered outcomes. 
 For only the first constructive step, namely the generation of a minimal substitute for the puzzle 
game of the picture P – we begin by an example. Then we shall construct the whole procedure in fully 
general terms.   
Introductory example of a minimal substitute for the puzzle game with P. Let (Π,U)D (D: dice) 
denote a dice-random-phenomenon constructed inside an epistemic referential denoted (G,Vr) where: 
- G introduces one replica of the object-entity-of-description œG consisting of a dice. This dice, 
however is here suspected of being loaded and so it is treated as an unknown object-entity to be 
studied and qualified: the dice-random phenomenon considered here, instead of belonging to the 
domain of games, is turned into a procedure for achieving a piece of scientific research.   
- Vr is an ‘active’ view that consists of performing the realizations of the experiment Π from the 
random phenomenon (Π,U)D in deliberately constructed conditions, namely: The table is put in the 
role of a device incorporated to Vr and the smoothness, horizontality, etc. of the tabletop have been 
thoroughly controlled in advance; Vr includes also an automatic device for throwing the dice; each 
time that, after a throw, the dice has settled still on the table, the numerical value of a global index 
r=1,2,3,4,5,6 is by definition the number marked on the upper face of the dice; a very big number of 
previous tests has established that the dimensions of the tabletop and the mechanism for automatic 
throws are such that the set of all the possible locations where the dice can settle after a throw is 
confined inside a finite spatial zone on the table-top, which is largely distant from the edges. Let us 
denote this zone by Z. 
The universe generated by (Π,U)D is by definition the set U≡{Dr}), r=1,2,3,4,5,6 of the 
specifications of a value of r. On this universe we construct the probability space 
[U≡{Dr},τT(U),pF(U)], r=1,2,3,4,5,6 where τT(U) is the total algebra on U and the unknown factual 
distribution of probabilities which we want to identify is pF(U)≡{pF(Dr)}, r=1,2,3,4,5,6. For simplicity 
{pF(Dr)}, r=1,2,3,4,5,6  is researched directly on U (which then determines it also on τT(U)).    
Let us now construct for the universe U to be studied, a 'complexified' structure of embedding 
and reference. Let (G,Vc) (c: complexifed, complexifying) be a epistemic referential where the 
operation of generation G is the same as in (G,Vr) but the complexified view Vc perceives all that in 
this case is directly observable concerning the outcome of a dice-throw, not only the six label-numbers 
r=1,2,3,4,5,6, namely:  
- The values of the label-aspect-view Vr.  
- The projection on the tabletop of the position of the centre of gravity of the dice with respect to 
a definite frame-aspect-view of space VE.  
- The orientation of the dice with respect to the directions of the edges of the rectangular table; 
this can be defined, say, by the angle α between a reference direction parallel to a given edge of the 
table, and an edge of a face of the dice singularized by some explicit definition. 
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So we have now Vc≡Vr∪Vα∪VE. The new complexified epistemic referential (G,Vc) with 
Vc≡Vr∪Vα∪VE generates a complexified set of elementary-event-descriptions, Uc≡{Drc}, rc=1,2,….sc. 
Oviously sc>s. Now – and this is quite essential in the present context – nothing permits to assume that 
all the complexified representations Drc of this or that initial description Dr do factually occur when 
the initial experiment Π is repeated an arbitrarily large number of times: We are not informed of the 
physical determinations which entail factual possibility or factual exclusion of a given complexified 
outcome Drc such as it is singularized by the complexified view Vc. The random phenomenon (Π,U) 
has been constructed under deliberate controls which did not take into account all the aspects and 
values of aspects subsequently introduced in the complexified view Vc. These controls are quite likely 
to have entailed physical characters involved in Π of which the roughness or even the nature excludes 
the factual outcome of certain Drc even though these are conceptually constructible with respect to the 
complexified view Vc; while among the complexifications Drc which have remained factually 
realizable, the outcomes are factually favored or inhibited by the mentioned physical characters in 
different unknown ways. In short, the factual content of the complexified Uc≡{Drc}, rc=1,2,….sc  and 
the factual distribution of probabilities on it, are not known in advance.    
Let us now achieve a more intuitive perception of the whole conceptual content of Uc. This can 
be done best by constructing an abstract representation space of Vc≡Vr∪Vα∪VE. We choose to 
subtend the complexified view Vc by mutually orthogonal semantic dimensions. Then the spatial 
location frame-aspect-view VE introduces three mutually orthogonal semantic reference-directions, ox, 
oy, oz, that carry on them, respectively, values x, y, z, defined with some finite arbitrary precision, say 
corresponding to a unit of length of 5 millimeters. The label aspect-view Vr
 
introduces one semantic 
label-direction that carries displayed on it the six 'values' 1,2,3,4,5,6 (marked in an arbitrary order). 
The orientation aspect-view Vα introduces a fifth semantic direction that carries on it values of the 
angle α equally defined with some finite arbitrary precision, say corresponding to a unit of 5 degrees.  
According to MRC (III.5, point (4)) any aspect-view is a filter that is blind with respect to 
qualifications that are not built into it. So the view Vc≡Vr∪Vα∪VE, endowed with the chosen units of 
length and of angle, does not distinguish qualifications that lie inside a unit interval. Let us agree that 
such a qualification is assigned the value defined by the biggest one of the two numbers that delimit 
the involved unit interval. This leads finally to a well defined 5-dimensional representation space 
endowed with 5 mutually orthogonal semantic directions and defining a finite points-grid of valuation. 
Let ǳ(Vc) denote this points-grid. Then a given quintuple of values of the parameters r,x,y,z,α defines 
one given 5-dimensional point from ǳ(Vc) represented by the global value-index rc(r,x,y,z,α). So each 
conceptually constructed complexified elementary-event-description DrcεUc is represented by a point 
r
c(r,x,y,z,α) from the grid ǳ(Vc), and vice versa.  
We now construct the total algebraτcT on Uc. The elementary-event-descriptions DrεU from the 
initial universe U≡{Dr}, r=1,2,3,4,5,6 have now migrated intoτcT. And there – with respect to the 
complexified view Vc≡Vr∪Vα∪VE – they appear retroactively as 'simplified' event-descriptions 
reduced to exclusively qualifications via the aspect-view VrεVc. So now, with respect to Vc, each 
given one outcome DrεU appears as realizable via a whole set of mutually distinct descriptions from 
the complexified universe of ‘elementary’ events Uc≡{Drc}. The pair (Uc,τcT) constitutes a structured 
reference background for the initially considered descriptions DrεU, which at the start did not exist.  
It is clear that the point-representations of a complexified descriptions DrcεUc are not fit for 
playing puzzle with them on the basis of semantic attractions by continuity on their borders: the 
concept of 'borders' has faded away in the abstract representations of the DrcεUc. But we have reached 
before the liberating conclusion that the requirement of this possibility can be dropped. And the pair 
(Uc,τcT) might be found to suffice for insuring the definability of an effective use of the two conditions 
which have been recognized as essential, namely to permit to build a finite closed whole 
corresponding to the studied random phenomenon (Π,U)D and to know when a replica of this whole 
had been completed. 
But here we stop the development of this introductory example and we go up on the general 
level of construction where we shall finally outline the whole procedure from A to Z.    
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A general substitute to the puzzle game with P. Consider now any random phenomenon (Π,U), 
U≡{Dr}, r=1,2,….s. Let (G,Vr), r=1,2,….s denote the epistemic referential where the description of 
this random phenomenon is worked out (r is a global index each value of which consists of a set of 
definite values of aspect-views VgεVr, all the aspect-views from the view Vr having contributed). Let 
[U, τT, pF(τT)] be the factual probability space defined on U where τT is the total algebra on U. So τT 
contains U and if we knew the factually true probability distribution pF(U) this would determine also 
the factually true distribution pF(τT) on τT, via the abstract requirement p(A∪B)≤p(A)+p(B) where 
equality obtains iff A and B possess no common elementary event.  
Quite generally the view Vr from the epistemic referential (G,Vr), r=1,2,….s where the random 
phenomenon (Π,U), U≡{Dr}, r=1,2,….s has been constructed, does not involve all the aspects that are 
directly observable on an outcome Dr. In particular, the spatial qualifications are quasi systematically 
ignored. While according to the space-time frame-principle (cf. III.5 point 6) such qualifications are 
necessarily present in the perception of the outcomes of the procedure Π .  
Let us form the epistemic referential (G,Vc) where the generator G is kept unchanged and Vc⊃Vr 
is a complexified view that contains the initially considered view V and furthermore introduces all the 
observable spatial qualifications. Let Uc≡{Drc}, with rc a complexified global index including all the 
directly observable aspects, be the set of all the 'complexifications' of the elementary-event-
descriptions {Dr}≡U, r=1,2,….s, that are conceptually constructible by the help of the view Vc. By 
construction we have sc>s.  
The set Uc is only an abstract, theoretical universe. Indeed we do not know in advance which 
ones among the conceptually constructible complexified outcomes DrcεUc do effectively realize when 
the initial experiment Π is repeated a very large number of times and the outcomes are examined via 
the complexified view Vc. Indeed the initial random phenomenon (Π,U) tied with the descriptions 
{Dr}≡U, r=1,2,…. to be studied has been constructed under controls tied with only the rougher view 
Vr to which certain conditions of factual realization of this or that DrcεUc qualified via the more 
complex view Vc are likely to have escaped, notwithstanding the conceptual constructability of Drc.  
Consider now the total algebra τcT on Uc. Like in the introductory example developed before, 
the elementary-event descriptions DrεU from the initial probability space [U≡{Dr},τT(U), pF(U)] have 
now migrated into the total algebra of events τcT on Uc. And there – with respect to the complexified 
view Vc – they appear retroactively as 'simplified' event-descriptions reduced to exclusively 
qualifications via the initial aspect-view VrεVc. So now, with respect to the new complexified view Vc, 
an outcome Dr appears as (theoretically) realizable via a whole set {Drc(r)}, r fixed, rc(r)=1,2,...sc(r) of 
elementary-event-descriptions Drc(r)εUc of which the exact factual content is not known in advance. 
But we know by construction that two sets {Drc(r)} and {Drc(r')} with r≠r' are mutually exclusive. 
Like in the introductory example again, the pair (Uc,τcT) is just a medium of conceptual embedment 
and reference organized for the elementary-event-descriptions DrεU in order to become able to 
qualify them in a way more detailed than that which is possible inside the initial epistemic referential 
(G,Vr).   
 Let us now construct explicitly the representation space of the complexified view Vc. Since each 
elementary event DrcεUc is a physical entity, according to the MRC frame-principle (III.5, point 6) the 
complexified view Vc necessarily includes some convenient space-frame-aspect-view V(E) endowed 
(in particular) with some definite choice of a length unit that determines the values of the space-
coordinates of the directly observable locations of the physical aspect-values gk involved by the 
outcome Drc.  
We admit that – by the construction of the random phenomenon (Π,U), U≡{Dr}, r=1,2,….s – the 
set of all the possible space-location coordinates is confined inside a delimited spatial zone Z. Inside Z 
the complexified elementary events DrcεUc can be mutually individualized as exactly as one wants, in 
consequence of the practically unlimited precision that can be assigned to spatial qualifications. 
Furthermore, we suppose that convenient units have been chosen for also all the semantic axes 
introduced by all the other aspect-views VgεVc that do admit of measurement. Finally, we suppose that 
on the semantic axes introduced by aspect-views involving non-measurable aspects, the values that are 
taken into consideration have been specified with some definite order, even if an arbitrary one.  
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When all this has been achieved, one can endow the representation space of Vc with a definite 
finite points-grid ǳ(Vc) which covers and exceeds largely the spatial zone Z where are confined by 
construction the factual outcomes DrεU of the initial random phenomenon (Π,U) to be studied..  
By our construction again, the representation on the grid ǳ(Vc) of any factual realization of a 
complexified representation DrcεUc of an outcome DrεU, is unique. 
The algorithm of semantic integration. From now on an effective identification of the factual 
numerical probability distribution {pF(U)} can be attempted via considerations entirely similar to those 
which in IV.1.5 and IV.2 concerned the probabilistic game with the puzzle of the painting P.  
As many replicas of the points-grid ǳ(Vc) as are necessary can be made use of. Let us start the 
realizations of the experiment Π from the random phenomenon to be studied (Π,U). Via the 
complexified view Vc the first outcome DrεU is observable as a complexified outcome DrcεUc which, 
inside τcT, realizes that DrεU. The representation with respect to the complexified referential (G,Vc) of 
this first observed outcome DrcεUc falls on a uniquely corresponding point from the first replica of the 
points-grid ǳ(Vc), which we denote by ǳ1 (Vc).  
While N increases, any new outcome will be represented:  
- either on the first replica ǳ1(Vc) of the grid ǳ(Vc), at the uniquely corresponding place 
indicated by the newly observed value of the complexified index rc, if this place is not yet occupied on 
ǳ1(Vc);  
 - or, if on ǳ1(Vc) the place indicated by the newly observed value of the complexified index rc 
is already occupied, the new outcome will be represented on the nearest replica ǳk(Vc) of ǳ(Vc) where 
that place is still available, with k=1,2,….K an integer that labels the already introduced replicas of 
ǳ(Vc) and K also a finite integer.  
The total number of points on one replica of the grid ǳ(Vc) is finite by construction and any 
factual outcome of the experiment Π is represented with respect to Vc by a unique place on ǳ(Vc). So 
the way of acting specified above entails the progressive emergence on ǳ1(Vc) of a cloud of points for 
which an evolving dotted delimitation acquires definition because by construction ǳ(Vc) covers largely 
the zone Z where factual outcomes DrεU can emerge: in this sense we can speak of the emergence on 
ǳ1(Vc) of a first representation φ1 of a still unknown but confined 'points-form' φ. Moreover – in the 
same time – also a sequence of other emergent more and more unachieved reproductions of this same 
points-form φ will have become observable on subsequently introduced replicas ǳ2(Vc) ǳ3(Vc),… 
ǳk(Vc)...,ǳK(Vc) of the points-grid ǳ(Vc).  
Sooner or later but in a finite time because everything is finite by construction, the first replica 
φ1 of φ will be observed to cease to evolve while the number N of realizations of the procedure Π 
continues to grow and to nourish the growths of the subsequent emergent points-forms labeled by 
k=2, 3,…. K. Thereby we shall know that φ1 is quasi certainly completed. 
Here we stop to make immediately a basic remark concerning the locution 'quasi certainly'. We 
employ this locution because nothing can exclude absolutely that never at some future time, while N 
increases, an outcome Drc will realize that finds its place still free on ǳ1(Vc), so which adds a new 
element to the points-form φ. All the following considerations are marked by this permanently pending 
possibility. But any natural law is marked by similar possibilities. And even a radical future 
modification keeps always possible, for a factual probability distribution as well as for any other sort 
of natural law. Both distributions of probability and natural laws asserted as certainties are but local 
conceptual constructs founded on a postulation of unchanged 'conditions' (MMS [2002] pp. 291-303). 
A certainly definitive, an absolutely stable factual truth can never be constructed conceptually. Only 
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syntactic 'truths' can be absolutely stable30. But these are conclusions of deductions, truths of logical 
inner coherence, not observational factual truths. (Moreover their sort of stability also, though in 
contradistinction to factual truth it can last indefinitely, nevertheless is indelibly relative, namely 
relative to the necessarily restrictive syntax where they have been established).  
We now resume the interrupted development. Suppose that we have continued to increase the 
number N of realizations of the experiment Π and that this has produced, say, K integrated point-forms 
that are all identical with φ1, as well as a new sequence of less and less achieved emerging point-
forms. We denote by φ(K) any one among these K mutually identical point-forms and we call it the K-
variant of the unknown point-form φ. On φ(K), just like on the integrated puzzle of the picture P, we 
can count the total number ncφ,Τ  of all the complexified outcomes Drcφ  that have been factually 
realized there31. And we can equally count, for any given description DrεU reconsidered as an event 
from the algebra of events τcT, the number ncφ(Κ) (r) of realizations inside φ(K) of that Dr, via this or 
that complexified factually realized outcome from the set of all the factual outcomes {Drcφ(Κ)(r)} with r 
fixed and rcφ(Κ)(r)=1,2,...scφ(Κ)(r). For the cardinal scφ(Κ)(r) of this factually realized set we can now 
write: scφ(Κ)(r) ≡F   ncφ(Κ) (r) (the sign '≡F' is to be read: factually identical to): this cardinal has acquired 
a meaning with respect to φ(K).  
By construction a complexified description Drc that is element of {Drcφ(Κ)(r)} cannot be also 
element of a set {Drcφ(Κ)(r')} where r'≠r. Equally by construction we have nφ(Κ),Τ =Σrncφ(Κ) (r)  and 
Σrnφ (Κ)(r)/nφ(Κ),Τ }=1,  r=1,2,….s. So – on the basis of considerations that are strictly analogous to 
those from IV.2 concerning the probabilistic game with the puzzle of the picture P, but are quite 
generally founded this time – we can assert that via a probability game with the elements Drcφ(Κ) of the 
finite and confined 'form' φ(Κ), the factual numerical definition of the probability of an event Dr is 
found to be the set of rational and factually registered numbers:  
{pF(r,K)}≡{nφ (Κ)(r)/nφ(Κ),Τ },  r=1,2,….s                        (4') 
Simulations by computer might permit to organize rather rapidly all the substratum for the 
estimations from (4'). 
The procedure that led to the definition (4') will be called the algorithm of semantic integration 
of the factual numerical probability distribution to be asserted on the universe U generated by the 
random phenomenon (Π,U).  
This algorithm is purely factual. The possibly unending confrontations between an a priori 
assertion of a uniform distribution of factual probabilities and an a posteriori verification of this 
assertion by measurements of relative frequencies, has been dissolved in a unique sequence of 
exclusively factual operations.  
But is this algorithm also clearly effective? How large should the integer K be in order to be 
authorized to assert the distribution (4')? As soon as one seeks the answer to this question, the 
definitions of the involved concepts lead to a radical simplification of the algorithm outlined above: 
What happens if, while N is still increased, a new point-event Drc is observed of which the place 
is still unoccupied on ǳ1(Vc), even though before the content of ǳ1(Vc) had remained unchanged 
during an already long succession of repetitions of Π ? Well, this would reveal that the point-event 
DrcεUc is factually possible, in other words, that its factual probability – whatever it is – is not null. 
But the statement of a non-null probability of that new Drc is equivalent to asserting that if the number 
N of repetitions of the experiment Π were very much increased, Drc would quasi certainly reappear 
from time to time, so that, progressively, it would occupy its place on all the already K constructed 
                                                 
30
 By definition, an 'observational truth' is an observation confirmed by comparison with natural circumstances, not with the requirements of 
a purely formal construct.  
31
 Remember this crucial point that Uc has been constructed as the receptacle of all the complexifications Drc of all the DrεU, which are 
conceptually constructible inside the referential (G,Vc), without knowing which ones among these can be factually produced when the 
initially constructed experiment Π  is repeated. 
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replicas identically denoted φ(K). This amounts to a retroactive modification of the concept 'φ(K)'. But 
we were prepared for this possibility: precisely because we have conceived it we have specified the 
relativity to K of the succession φ1, φ2, φ3, ,…φk,…φK of the identical points-forms which we had 
obtained.    
On the basis of this reasoning any event Drc which still finds its place free on φ1, even after a 
very long period of apparent saturation, can be immediately reproduced on also all the other possible 
replicas of φ. So, as soon as we are already endowed with a first replica φ1 of φ that behaves for a time 
as it were saturated, we are in fact endowed during this time with an arbitrarily long sequence φ2, φ3, 
,…..φk,… of mutually identical point-forms. This is entailed by the fact that, in contradistinction to the 
example of the probabilistic game with puzzle of the painting P, in the general case treated here the 
presupposed form φ itself is unknown at the start, not only the factual distribution of probabilities tied 
with it. So, by absence of a definite reference, we never know certainly whether a replica of the 
posited form φ is achieved, or not. However, the mere postulation of the existence of a form φ together 
with the deliberate construction of the conditions for observable manifestations of this existence – 
namely a stability of the content of φ1 while a whole succession φ2, φ3, ,….. φk ,… φK of subsequent 
replicas of φ emerges and develops – induce already a peculiar sort of quantification of the number N 
of achieved repetitions of Π : say, a K-quantification. For these manifestations of the existence of a 
form φ, though relative to the number K, act throughout the process of emergence of all the points-
forms φ(K) like a sort of punctuation that breaks the amorphous flux of the uniformly increasing 
number N of realizations of Π from the theorem of large numbers, in a sequence of mutually separated 
entities. Precisely here lies the importance of being able to associate with the random phenomenon 
(Π,U), a concept of a finite and delimited whole. Even if we cannot know with rigorous certainty 
whether this punctuation is like a full-stop or like a semi-colon, so whether yes or not the content of 
outcomes Drc already registered inside all the replicas φ(K) exhausts the content of the unknown form 
φ, nevertheless the mentioned quantification marks –  by the parameter k – the places reachable by a 
finite number of repetitions of Π where we can decide to cease the research and to draw already a 
conclusion relative to the number K, namely the conclusion defined by (4').  
In this sense the algorithm of semantic integration of (4') is effective. And one cannot hope 
more: 
As long as we stay inside the framework of the probabilistic conceptualization, effectiveness tied 
with rigorous certainty is just contradiction. 
But of course, the exact relation between the sort of effectiveness entailed by the algorithm of 
semantic integration, and the theorem of large numbers, must be examined more thoroughly. Just 
below however we shall first draw attention to the main conceptual consequences of the algorithm of 
semantic integration.       
Significance of the 'existence' of a factual probability distribution. The algorithm of semantic 
integration involves radically new and quite definite non-mathematical meanings for the notion of a 
factual distribution of numerical probabilities on the universe U generated by the random phenomenon 
(Π,U):  
- The 'existence' of a factual probability distribution – the mere existence whatever the content – 
is equivalent to the assertion of a progressive process of emergence and saturation, on the grid ǳ(Vc) 
constructed for (Π,U), of a points-form φ made up by the representation-points of all the factually 
possible complexified elementary-event-descriptions Drc from the reference-universe Uc.  
- The numerical distribution of probabilities itself expresses the way in which, when the points-
form φ has reached a quasi certain stability inside K replicas of φ, the probabilities of the event-
descriptions DrεU are defined inside this form relatively to K, as well, of course, as relatively also to 
all the other involved restrictions.  
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Individual description versus probabilistic description. The meanings stated above identify the 
specificities of a probabilistic description inside the general category of descriptions of physical 
entities: According to MRC any communicable and consensual knowledge is description, so precisely 
a points-form of space-time-and-aspect-values endowed with some invariance, either individual or 
probabilistic (III.5, points 5, 6, 11).  
When the description is individual, the corresponding form of space-time-aspect-values, usually; 
is immediately 'understood', it carries an obvious 'significance'.  
But when the description is tied with a random phenomenon (Π,U), U≡{Dr}, r=1,2,….s the 
involved physical situation in general escapes a direct and integrated human perceptibility, because it 
involves features too tiny, or too large, or partly hidden, and anyhow too complex to be immediately 
put together inside one organized structure. Moreover, in the fragments of the involved integral 
physical situation which are directly perceived, certain spatial features or more generally certain 
space-time features32 (distances, angles, relative durations, etc.), are occulted; they are filtered out 
more or less conventionally or arbitrarily. Only certain isolated indications stemming from this 
integral structure are directly observable and noticed. What has been denoted DrεU represents only 
such indications; and the lacunae with respect to the global physical organization which is at work, 
destroy the intelligibility. They destroy even the capacity to merely imagine the existence of the 
involved factual 'whole'. The relative frequencies of the outcomes of the watched 'elementary' events 
DrεU, by their observable tendency toward stability when the number N of repetitions of the 
procedure Π increases, construct progressively – by parceled random touches – a purely numerical and 
radically cryptic representation of the unknown physical whole from which they stem. They generate a 
sort of coded, random and approximate asymptotic 'reading' of this whole, which conveys only 
impoverished and pulverized signals from it. And even when, a posteriori, these relative frequencies 
are considered simultaneously for all the events Dr and with their stabilized values, the factual 
probability distribution {pF(r,K}, r=1,2,….s which emerges still yields merely a meaningless 
numerical expression of the now fully accomplished, but impoverished and randomized process of 
reading in cryptic terms the unknown physical whole which generated the distribution. 
Here comes in the remarkable role of the 'complexifications'  Drc(r) εUc constructed for the 
directly perceived event-descriptions DrεU. These complexifications, by embedment and reference, 
permit to accede a more or less conventional representation of a global form φ associable with (Π,U). 
Because of the various conventions involved in its construction, this global form is only an element of 
a whole class of forms equally possible with respect to the data (Π,U), U≡{Dr}, r=1,2,….s. The 
representations from this class still offer an only coded integrated description of the whole conceived 
to be at work. Indeed the involved qualia are only represented, they are not perceived, and – as it is 
requires by the conventional character of certain representational choices – any specifications of the 
ways in which do realize in fact the juxtapositions of the complexified descriptions DrcεUc 
represented by the points from φ, are entirely lacking. But in spite of all these lacks, the mutual 
individualization by the complexified outcomes Drc(r)εUc of 'one same' DrεU and the possibility to 
count of these outcomes inside a finite and closed whole, suffice for investing with intelligibility the 
notion of probability of an event-description DrεU. 
On the truth of the points-form φ. The considerations made above show that it would be 
meaningless to ask whether the integrated form φ is 'true'. It is just a conceptual construct achieved 
with the aim to work out a factual definition for the numerical probability distribution to be asserted 
on the universe U generated by a random phenomenon (Π,U). As for this definition itself, it is true in 
so far that it can be factually produced and 'verified'.  
This brings us back to the necessity of a thorough examination of the logical compatibility 
between the definition (4') and the formal concept of probability and the theorem of large numbers. 
                                                 
32
 In all the considerations from this work the role played by spatial features can be extended to space-time features. 
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Construction of a factual-formal variant of the theorem of large numbers 
Consider again the expression (2) of the theorem of large numbers 
∀r,   ∀(ε, δ),    ∃N0 :   ∀(N≥ N0)  ⇒   P [(n(er)/N - p(er)) ≤ ε ] ≥ (1 - δ)   (2) 
This expression has been proved inside the syntactic theory of probabilities. The abstract 
concept of a probability p(er) involved in (2) amounts to:  
(a) Presupposition of the existence of a numerically non-specified mathematical limit denoted 
p(er) toward which the measured relative frequencies n(er)/N are asserted to converge and definition of 
the 'probability of er' as precisely that limit, for any fixed value of the index r ; 
(b) Specification of exclusively the well known general abstract structure recalled in the note 3 
assigned to the whole set of mathematical limits {p(er))}, r=1,2…s,  left void of any specification of a 
distribution of numerical values characteristic of this or that factual probabilistic situation. 
The same holds for P, mutatis mutandis. 
Both (a) and (b) express a non effective and semantically void point of view, deliberately made 
fit for the role of insuring maximal generality as a mathematical receptacle for any factual probabilistic 
data. And there is no other semantic content in the abstract concepts of probability of an event and of 
probability measure on a universe of events.   
Consider now the whole equation (2). It represents the syntactic evolution of the relation 
between the mathematical limit p(er) – initially void of specification of a numerical value – and the 
relative frequency n(er)/N, while the integer N that counts the accomplished repetitions of the 
considered experiment Π tends toward infinity by uniform ordered steps of one unit integers 1 which 
progressively inject a numerical value into the sign p(er).  
The uniform progression of N extends over the whole abstract interval from 1 to ∞ and it runs 
through this extension in a way that is blind with respect to semantic peaks of 'significance' of the ratio 
n(er)/N with respect to the definability of a factual probability pφ F(Dr,K)≡ nφ (Κ)(r)/nφ(Κ),Τ . Furthermore, 
it does not take into account factual human impossibilities concerning the future; correlatively it does 
not distinguish between a priori hypothetical factual assertions and a posteriori factual findings. It just 
goes on toward ∞ by mutually equal steps. The fluctuations in the way of evolving of the value of the 
ratio n(er)/N, are free of any regulation. The syntactic way of fighting these fluctuations inside the 
framework of the equation (2) is only their méta-probable confinement imposed by a pair (ε,δ) of 
arbitrarily small real numbers.  
Let us compare with the quantifying procedure of semantic integration where mainly the 
semantic contents and their evolution are watched. While the number of successive realizations of Π is 
increased from 1 to nφ(K),Τ  the variable N evolves inside a domain of 'absence of a full significance' 
with respect to the concept of probability pφ F(Dr,K)≡ nφ (Κ)(r)/nφ(Κ),Τ   with r=1,2,….s. Indeed with 
1≤N≤nφ(K)T the points-form φ(K) is not yet achieved, so the counting that determines the probabilities 
from the factual distribution (4') cannot be assumed to be fully significant. The same holds for nφ(K),T ≤ 
N ≤ 2nφ(K)T,  2nφ(K),T ≤ N ≤ 3nφ(K),T …… So with respect to the semantic considerations and to 
definability of the probabilities pφ(K) F(Dr)≡ nφ (Κ)(r)/nφ(Κ),Τ , r=1,2,….s from (4') there are peaks 
N=knφ(K),T with k=1, 2,…..K of full significance outside which this relative significance is gradually 
increasing or decreasing with a period ∆N=nφ(Κ),Τ.. 
But from a purely numerical point of view, the algorithm, just like the equation (2), introduces a 
uniform and ordered progression of the integer N. Meanwhile however this algorithm also takes into 
account simultaneously all the semantic contents of all the outcomes Drc(r), r=1,2,….s and on the 
basis of these it selects the place of each outcome Drc on this or that replica of the grid ǳ(Vc) quite 
independently of the order of its emergence inside the sequence of 1,2,3…..N of repetitions of the 
experiment Π. In this way, by semantically founded locations of the outcomes, the algorithm separates 
from inside the steadily increasing sequence of repetitions of the procedure Π, accomplished K-quanta 
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of significance with respect to the aim of defining the set of factual probabilities pφ(K), F(Dr) ≡ 
nφ(Κ) (r)/nφ(Κ)Τ , r=1,2,….s.  
These semantically regulated organizations of the successively registered results Drc produced 
by the uniform progression of the number N, are what absorbs and dissolves into a unique and 
entirely factual approach, the necessity of possibly never ending [a priori-a posteriori] dialogs, 
which up to now could not be avoided.  
Let us now examine closely the formal compatibility between the algorithm of semantic 
integration and the theorem of large numbers (2): We shall attempt to embed the algorithm of semantic 
integration, into the abstract framework of the equation (2). 
We introduce the identification of terms er≡Dr and from now, for simplicity, we renote Dr by r.  
We fix a given value r, as in the equation (2). Furthermore in the absolute difference from the equation 
(2) we substitute to the unspecified but real numerical value p(er), the rational number nφ(Κ) (r)/nφ(Κ),Τ  
specified by (4'). Thereby p(er) acquires a factual specification of its numerical value which in (2) is 
lacking, while the rational number nφ(Κ) (r)/nφ(Κ),Τ  acquires the syntactic definition from (2) for the 
probability of an event Dr which for the factual probability pF(r,K) was lacking in (4'), namely its 
definition as the mathematical limit toward which the classical factual ratio n(r)/N must tend when N 
increases toward infinity via its semantically blind evolution. So with k =1, 2,…K and K indefinitely 
increasable we have:  
[p(er)≡ pF(r,K)] =  
= Σ k
 
nφ (Κ)(r)/Σ k nφ(Κ),Τ  = K nφ (Κ)(r)/K nφ(Κ),Τ   = nφ (Κ)(r)/nφ(Κ), T  = limK.N→ ∞ (n(r)/N)         (5) 
The symbol limK N→∞ means lim.N→∞(n(r)/N) relatively to the hypothesis that the points-form φ(K) 
exhausts the unknown form φ. We furthermore introduce the new notations: 
 N=N(K)=Knφ(Κ),Τ +N' ,   n(r)= Knφ(Κ),(r)+n'(r)           (6) 
where the term Knφ(Κ),Τ  represents the number of unit steps from N which have got consumed in the 
construction of all the mutually identical K points-forms φ(K) and so have introduced Knφ (Κ)(r) 
realizations of the event Dr. The term  N' represents the supplementary number of unit steps from N 
which have got consumed in the construction of emergent but not yet achieved drafts of the unknown 
form φ and so have introduced some unknown number n'(r) of realizations of Dr that are not yet 
'significant' with respect to the definition (4') of pF(r,K).   
With the notations introduced above, the absolute difference from (2) becomes 
n(r)/N(K) – pF(r,K) = [(K nφ(Κ) (r) + n'(r)) / (K nφ(Κ), T + N')] - (nφ(Κ) (r)/nφ(Κ), T )        (7)  
So we finally obtain the following 'factualized' and numerically specified variant of the theorem 
of large numbers: 
∀r,  ∀(ε, δ), ∀K,      ∃N0 :   ∀((N(K) ≥ N0),  N(K)=K nφ(Κ), T + N'     ⇒    
⇒  P [ [(K nφ(Κ) (r) + n'(r)) / (K nφ(Κ), T + N')] - (nφ(Κ) (r)/nφ(Κ), T )  ≤ ε ] ≥ (1 - δ)         (2') 
 
By trivial transformations the absolute difference (7) involved by (2') becomes 
 ( nφ(Κ), T  n'(r) - nφ(Κ) (r) N') / (K(nφ(Κ), T )2+ nφ(Κ), T N')             (7') 
On (7') it can be explicitly seen that when the number K (so N(K)) is increased indefinitely, the 
difference from (7) and (2') tends toward zero because: nφ(Κ), T and, nφ(Κ) (r) are quasi certainly 
constant; n'(r) and N' can be considered to keep constant in the mean even though in general they 
fluctuate when a passage occurs from a given value K to the value K+1, because the general physical 
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conditions are invariant with respect to the value of K that marks such a passage; while K increases 
indefinitely and nφ(Κ), T is bigger than both nφ(Κ) (r) and n'(r).  
The form (2') of the theorem of large numbers has been obtained by just injecting into the 
expression (2) the factual structure (6) of the numbers N, n(r) defined for these numbers by the 
algorithm of semantic integration, as well as the numerical factual value pF(r,K) assigned by this 
algorithm for the abstract probability p(Dr) defined syntactically as lim.N→∞(n(Dr)/N).  
The substitution (5) to the unknown but fixed number p(er), of the possibly evolving and 
'quantified' number pF(r,K), is the core of  a change in the general view expressed by (2'), with respect 
of the view expressed by (2): the number pF(r,K) is no more regarded as a fixed limit, but as a possibly 
evolving term (though for K of the order of several units the evolution of the value of pF(r,K) is 
already unlikely). But this change of view generates no formal contradiction inside the very tolerant 
(ε,δ)-approximate and (meta)-probabilistic (via P) syntactic framework of the theorem of large 
numbers: this framework remains blind with respect to the mentioned change. 
On the other hand it permits to complete this framework by semantically founded numerical 
specifications which in (2) are left free.  
The result (2') is now a non circular syntactic-semantic proposition, in the following sense. The 
definition (4') of a factual probability distribution pF(r,K)=[nφ(Κ) (r)/nφ(Κ),  T changes nothing in the 
numerical values of the ratios n(r)/N from (2) and in the evolution of these33. Now, a definition of the 
type (4') which does not interfere with the purely numerical aspects of the relative frequencies of the 
events to which this definition refers, can be constructed for any probability. So in particular, a 
definition of type (4') can be constructed also for the meta-probability P from (2) (in that case the 
considered 'events' are the numerical values acquired by the absolute difference from (2') for each 
choice of a set of values (r, (ε, δ), K)). This general possibility entails that the form (2') ceases to 
define a probability p(er) by use of another probability P, since the probabilities p(er) and P possess 
own and mutually independent definitions which do not alter the relative frequencies tied with them, 
respectively. So (2') asserts only relations between the probabilities pF(r,K), P, and the involved – 
respective – relative frequencies. Namely, the new, factual, semantic-syntactic and non circular 
proposition (2') asserts – as the expressions (7) and (7') show – that the involved absolute difference 
concerns only the 'non-significant excesses' n'(r) and N' from the ratio n(r)/N), with respect to the peak 
of exact definability of the factual probability pF(r,K) by use of the algorithm of semantic integration.  
As for the proof of the whole theorem of large numbers, it insures that the chosen pair of real 
numbers (ε,δ) and the meta-probability P guarantee that the value of the absolute difference from (7) 
and (2') – calculated for the hypothetical and possibly variable numerical value (4') assigned to the 
probability pF(r,K), which in (2) is not defined – tends toward 0 in probability when K (so N(K)) is 
indefinitely increased (indeed since rational numbers are real numbers the substitution (5) amounts to 
considering a particular class of mathematical cases). Thereby the theorem of large numbers takes in 
charge both the a priori possible fluctuations of what we have called 'the quasi certain completeness' 
of the points-forms φ(K), and the existence, in general, of fluctuations of the numbers n'(r) and N' 
while K is increased. 
We conclude that there is logical consistency between the algorithm of semantic integration and 
the theorem of large numbers; and that moreover there is synergy between them. But in fact, for cases 
where the 'quantum' nφ(Κ),Τ  is large, the algorithm of semantic integration permits far more rapid and 
more informed estimations than those which can be drawn from (2'), of the factual probability 
distribution to be asserted on the universe U of outcomes generated by a random phenomenon (Π,U). 
                                                 
33
 We have already stressed, and we repeat, that the translation of this ratios in our terms –  n(r)/N=[(Knφ(Κ) (r)+n'(r))/(K nφ(Κ), T + N')] – 
point exclusively toward the semantic choices of the locations of the outcomes Drc of the N successive repetitions of the experiment Π, they 
change nothing in the pure numeration  of these repetitions and of their outcomes. 
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Conclusion 
The algorithm of semantic integration solves Kolmogorov's aporia.  
It does not solve it by a deductive approach, but by a constructive procedure which is formally 
compatible with the theorem of large numbers and admits integration in it.  
It seems difficult to advance further in the attempt at associating in a common coherent view, a 
syntactic, fully deductive structure like the theorem of large numbers, and on the other hand a factual 
procedure achieved inside a qualitative method of conceptualization. Insofar that one accepts that the 
attempt developed here offers a satisfactory association of this kind, this attempt organizes the whole 
classical concept of 'probability'.  
 
V. ON 'PROBABILITIES' IN MICROPHYSICS  
The algorithm of semantic integration cannot be applied to the random phenomena tied with 
microstates. Indeed for these, 'complexifications' Drc of the observed results cannot be constructed. 
The results of measurements on a microstate quasi generally consist of exclusively space-time 
locations of observable marks that do not produce in the observer's mind any qualia carrying a definite 
semantic content. The mere space-time location of these marks is pre-coded in terms of values of some 
'quantity' assigned to a microstate, on the basis of hidden, 'illegal', more or less implicit and non 
consensual, but nevertheless utilized models of a microstate and of its mechanical characters.  
These mere space-time locations of observable marks, void of own direct significance, cannot in 
any way be observably expanded in more complex events.  
This – surprisingly – entails that what is quite unanimously called the 'essential' or 'primordial' 
probability laws established for microstates (cf. MMS [2009]), in fact are merely statistical primordial 
distributions for which the existence of a mathematical limit can be, at most, just asserted and – more 
or less – checked by an observed tendency, in a way that never is strictly effective.  
As for the possibility to determine the factual quantum mechanical probability law to be asserted 
in any given probabilistic situation concerning microstates, by deriving this law from the mathematical 
representations that constitute the theory, its generality seems highly problematic (cf. note 14). So, in 
general, with respect to a microstate, one is reduced to only indications of a tendency toward 
convergence obtained by measurements of relative frequencies performed in physical conditions 
consistent with the mathematical representations. 
This conclusion, which probably is very personal, is here submitted to the physicists for 
discussion: It might come out that the concept of probability is constructible in an effective way only 
inside the domain of classical thinking where the entities-to-be-qualified are directly perceptible with 
qualia different from exclusively their space-time locations and where models founded on these direct 
more complex perceptions can be built and expressed in terms of 'objects' (MMS [2006] pp. 118-
127)34. 
VI. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
In the present phase of the scientific thinking the concepts of statistics and of probability require 
a thorough reconstruction if it is wanted to bring them to cover in an exhaustive and coherent way both 
the classical thinking and nowadays microphysics.  
This work has been intended as an attempt on this direction.  
At the same time it has been conceived as also an illustration of the way in which the method of 
relativized conceptualization can be made use of in order to clarify concepts and questions and to 
construct solutions to the questions.  
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